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1 Introduction     
A central goal in corporate finance is to understand how capital is allocated in the economy – both across 
and within firms. Most research focuses on across-firm allocation, i.e., the process through which external 
capital is allocated to individual firms via financial markets and financial institutions. However, a critical 
part of the capital allocation process in the economy occurs within the organization itself: firms allocate 
(internally and externally raised) capital within and across different lines of business. Despite its relevance, 
the level of direct knowledge of the workings of internal capital allocation and how it relates to the 
organization of the firm is rather limited. Relevant data are typically unobservable, as they remain largely 
undisclosed to outsiders. Therefore, research has focused primarily on the derivation of theoretical results 
– with a focus on investment outcomes and sometimes the optimal processes themselves. This paper 
provides new empirical evidence on internal capital allocation and its process, overcoming some of the 
typical data limitations by using a unique survey data set of CFOs.  
With our survey, we get inside the ‘black box’ and analyze the structure and organization of capital 
allocation of a broad set of 115 firms. Our objective is to seek answers to central but to date insufficiently 
understood questions of internal capital allocation. The first is to seek evidence for central frictions 
influencing the efficiency of corporate investment. Although theory postulates that agency and 
information issues inside firms are responsible for distortions of corporate investment, there is little direct 
evidence about the extent to which they are perceived inside firms. Our survey directly asks CFOs about 
these frictions, and we use the survey data to construct a novel measure of within-firm agency problems. 
Second, we aim to uncover the mechanisms firms apply to curtail the consequences of those frictions in 
the capital allocation process. The finance and accounting literature suggests many curative mechanisms, 
yet we lack detailed knowledge about both their importance and their prevalence. Third, we examine 
deviations from the traditional paradigm of capital allocation, which is characterized by decentralized 
bottom-up project initiation of lower-level management but centralized project selection at the level of 
headquarters. More specifically, we study aspects of the delegation of investment authority from higher 
levels in the organization to lower levels and the involvement of divisions in the capital allocation process. 
We also reveal how top management uses its own expertise and other soft, non-financial information in 
the decision to allocate capital. These aspects have been largely ignored in the literature but have recently 
been recognized as important facets of capital allocation. Fourth, we examine within-firm capital 
reallocations, a key feature of internal capital markets. Top management’s ownership rights allow the 
reallocation of resources at will within the firm. Still, top management’s hands may (effectively) be tied 
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because the implied stripping of resources of some divisions may have high costs. Finally, we look at the 
interaction of capital allocation and financing. A growing literature suggests several ways how replacing 
the external capital market with an internal one may affect corporate financing. However, it has remained 
largely unexplored which of these effects are considered most important by financial executives.  
The following key findings emerge from our analysis: First, when asked directly, financial executives 
acknowledge the prevalence of within-firm agency problems and confirm their effect on capital budgeting. 
Empire-building tendencies at the divisional level and wasteful influencing activities to attract more 
capital are particularly common manifestations of agency problems. To mitigate the effects of agency 
problems on investment outcomes, headquarters implements a variety of mechanisms: layers of approval, 
division budgets and mechanisms for mitigating information biases. Each of these organizational measures 
represents one part of a larger corporate system to counteract agency problems when allocating capital. 
For instance, headquarters requires central approval for major investments in nearly all firms. However, 
many CFOs report that investment plans and financial projections that divisional managers provide are 
biased toward attracting a larger share of the overall capital budget. Therefore, headquarters implements 
certain budgeting procedures that elicit the revelation of managers’ private information when divisional 
managers submit proposals. Firms report the use of many instruments that previous works in finance and 
accounting suggest. Among the most important instruments are inflated hurdle rates that correct for 
misrepresentation of private information, compensation schemes that tie division managers’ pay to overall 
firm performance, and reliance on hard, easy-to-verify information. Despite the distortions that lower-
level agency problems can cause, and perhaps surprisingly, top management gives divisions considerable 
discretion over capital expenditures. On average, approximately 40% of overall capital expenditures do 
not require explicit investment approval by headquarters. This number is surprisingly high. When we 
examine the factors that influence this fraction of overall capital expenditures, we find evidence consistent 
with a tradeoff: when establishing divisional budgets, headquarters balances the benefits of the efficient 
use of local information (e.g., lower information acquisition and processing cost) and its costs of agency 
(e.g., loss of control/empire-building, monitoring cost). These findings tie our results to the larger agenda 
of the delegation of authority and decentralization in organizations in the literature.  
Second, when we turn to the analysis of budgeting methods for individual projects, we find several 
deviations from the assumptions of most of the theoretical literature. The capital allocation process 
contains not only bottom-up but also top-down components. Although firms’ headquarters must somehow 
rely on financial projections and other hard information provided by divisions when allocating capital, 
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they extensively use their own (mostly soft) information that resides exclusively at headquarters: Strategic 
information held by headquarters influences capital allocation as much as the assessment of divisional 
managers’ abilities does. These factors turn out to be particularly relevant in the presence of severe agency 
issues. CFOs also point out the importance of the availability of non-financial (implementation) resources, 
which implies that such non-capital constraints, such as manpower, are overlooked in the literature but are 
highly important from the perspective of financial executives.  
The third set of findings relates to the workings of internal markets for capital and their effects on 
financing. Our evidence confirms that divisions typically have no access to external capital. Instead, they 
seek funds in the internal capital market through the capital allocation process. CFOs indicate that they 
frequently move capital from divisions that generate strong cash flow to divisions with little cash flow but 
favorable investment opportunities to achieve the highest capital productivity. However, our evidence also 
suggests that firms even restrict divisions’ access to internal capital markets under some circumstances: if 
agency problems are perceived to be large, firms tend to quantity-ration a division’s investment by limiting 
capital allocation to the division’s cash flow. Many executives also recognize that capital allocation 
decisions frequently lead to a more evenly distributed allocation than financial criteria suggest. This 
irregularity has stimulated previous theoretical work on the motives for cross-subsidies (or socialism) in 
internal markets. When we examine the relative importance of these motives, one reason stands out: 
headquarters strategically distorts investment because capital allocation conveys information to internal 
and external stakeholders. The finding confirms the role of capital allocation as an important device for 
credible communication. Finally, CFOs have strong opinions about the financial benefits of internal 
capital markets. They perceive such benefits predominantly in higher debt capacities and lower costs of 
capital. These findings support coinsurance arguments suggesting that internal capital markets may 
improve access to external financing, but challenge the conventional portfolio view of the firm.   
A number of other papers present survey evidence on capital investment (e.g., Gitman and Forrester, 1977; 
Stanley and Block, 1984; Ross, 1986; Graham and Harvey, 2001). The work closest to ours is perhaps by 
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015), who examine differences in the delegation of decision-making authority 
across financial policies (i.e., capital structure, payout, investment or M&A). They also study decision 
rules associated with capital allocation with a focus on international differences and career-related 
characteristics of CEOs/CFOs. Most other surveys of capital allocation focus on the techniques how firms 
evaluate individual investment projects. None of the aforementioned studies examines the aspects of 
capital reallocation across divisions and internal capital markets that we cover, and none of them directs 
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attention to the agency relationship between top management and division managers. Finally, our 
objective is to understand the (micro)foundations of capital allocation within firms—this is why we put 
emphasis on a survey instrument that is closely guided by economic theory and previous empirical 
evidence. Wherever appropriate, we relate or contrast our findings to the results of these studies and other 
related work. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the methodology, describe the dataset, and 
provide summary statistics. Section 3 analyzes the organization of internal capital allocation. Section 4 
focuses on corporate investment in internal capital markets. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Methodology   
2.1 Survey Development and Sample Selection 
In preparing the questionnaire, we reviewed the economics, finance, and accounting literature on capital 
allocation and extracted predictions and arguments to develop a draft survey.1 We pre-tested this draft 
with a group of CEOs and CFOs through personal interviews to ensure the consistent meaning of survey 
questions. These interviews took 60-90 minutes. We also mailed the survey instrument to a group of 
academic experts for review and feedback. The final four-page questionnaire was structured into five 
sections that contained 88 questions. One of these sections also collected demographic characteristics of 
the surveyed firms and their CFOs. The final questionnaire took an average of 25 minutes to answer in 
our beta testing group.  
The focus of our research is on Western European companies from 11 major economies: the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
and Denmark. For sample selection, we obtain data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope for the 2008 fiscal 
year, and we restrict the sample to firms with sales of €10 million or more. Smaller firms are unlikely to 
meet the requirements for the types of firms we have in mind for large parts of the questionnaire: firms 
that organize business activities in distinct operating segments overseen by a corporate headquarters. Since 
one major interest of our study is how divisions obtain funds for capital investment through internal capital 
markets, we focus on diversified firms. Diversified firms operate internal capital markets, in which 
corporate headquarters pools cash flows from diverse sources and divisions seek funds through the capital 
                                                 
1 The final questionnaire and a comprehensive overview of the theories that guided its design are in the Internet Appendix. 
Therein, we provide brief summaries of theories and link these to the corresponding questions.  
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allocation process (versus through financial markets).2 Following standard practice, we define diversified 
firms as those firms that report segments in at least two different 3-digit SIC codes and generate less than 
90% of sales in one 3-digit SIC code industry (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007; Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales, 2000; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). This relatively narrow industry definition 
allows for distinguishing between firms with related and unrelated lines of business in subsequent 
chapters. Additionally, we exclude companies if the sum of reported segment revenues differs from total 
revenue. Because many of the hypotheses are not applicable to pure financial firms, we exclude firms that 
generate the majority (more than 50%) of their revenues in SIC codes starting with 6.   
2.2 Delivery and Response 
We identified 992 firms that matched the selection criteria and mailed the questionnaire along with a 
personalized and signed cover letter. We obtained firm and CFO contact information from several sources, 
primarily Thomson Reuters Worldscope, but also Bloomberg, Compustat, and Capital IQ. The 
questionnaire was sent on April 26, 2010. To increase the response rate, we offered participating financial 
executives an advanced report of the results. Additionally, we employed a team of graduate students to 
make follow-up calls and re-mail a second copy of the questionnaire if requested. The survey design 
followed the principles proposed by Dillman (1978), Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink (2004), Bednar 
and Westphal (2006), and Baruch and Holtom (2008). We requested that the survey be returned via fax, 
mail, or e-mail by May 7, 2010.  
Overall, 115 CFOs returned fully completed surveys, for a response rate of 11.6%. Given the length of the 
survey, the response rate compares favorably to those of most similar studies, such as Graham and Harvey 
(2001) with 8.9%, Brounen, de Jong, and Koedijk (2004) with 4.8%, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005) with 10.4%, Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) with 8.9%, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) with 
8.7%, Dichev et al. (2013) with 5.4%, or McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) with 4.3%.   
2.3 Respondent Characteristics 
Table A presents self-reported summary statistics of both the firms in our sample and the CFOs who 
returned useable surveys. The sample is balanced between small firms (42%, firms with €1 billion in sales 
or less) and large firms (58%, firms with more than €1 billion in sales). All the firms in our sample operate 
                                                 
2  Standalone firms may or may not employ an internal capital market (see Gertner and Scharfstein, 2013; Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2013).  
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at least two divisions. These divisions are active in several industries, including manufacturing (26%), 
construction (11%), retail and wholesale (9%), high-tech (9%), energy (8%), and transportation (7%), 
among others. We also asked for personal characteristics of the financial executives. Nearly all the 
financial executives are male (98%), more than half (55%) are 50 or younger, and 67% have an MBA or 
a doctoral degree. Consistent with previous studies (for instance, Graham and Harvey, 2001), our sample 
indicates that financial executives change jobs frequently: nearly 60% have been in their job for a 
maximum of five years.   
We use several control variables to analyze survey responses conditional on firm characteristics that may 
affect internal capital allocation. We selected these variables based on the review of the literature to exploit 
heterogeneity across certain subsamples of the responding firms. Except for nominal variables, we use 
medians as the cutoff points to categorize firms (see Table B for the full set of variable definitions and 
their categories). For instance, the median firm in our sample operates three lines of business. Therefore, 
we define firms as having “few” lines of business (55%) when they report two or three different lines of 
business and as having “many” lines of business (45%) if they run four or more different lines of business. 
We also investigate whether the degree of relatedness in diversification has an impact on survey results. 
As a proxy for relatedness, we asked CFOs to indicate the major industries in which their firm operates 
(retail and wholesale, mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation, energy, communication and 
media, banking and insurance, high-tech, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, and services/consulting).3 We 
define firms as “unrelated diversified” firms (43%) if they operate in more than one major industry and as 
“related diversified” firms (57%) if they run business lines within one industry only. Because the firm’s 
ability to secure external financing has a direct impact on corporate investment, we asked CFOs if they 
perceive their companies as facing capital constraints when capital markets are operating normally. We 
thus can build subsamples of “capital-constrained” (30%) and “capital-unconstrained” firms (70%). 
Furthermore, we refer to firms as “high leverage” firms if their debt-to-asset ratio is larger than the sample 
median (44%) and as “low leverage” firms if their debt ratio is below (56%). Moreover, we consider the 
effect of long-term credit ratings. We classify firms into “high rating” firms (41%; ratings of A- and better) 
and “low rating” firms (59%; BBB+ and worse). Finally, we build subsamples for CFO characteristics 
distinguishing between “young” (55%; age ≤ 50) and “mature” CFOs (45%; age > 50) as well as between 
“short” tenure (50%; four years and less in the CFO position) and “long” tenure CFOs (50%; five and 
more years). Throughout our study, we perform univariate analyses on survey questions conditional on 
                                                 
3 The industry classification is from Graham and Harvey (2001) and their subsequent CFO surveys. 
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each of these variables. Because some firm characteristics are correlated (see Table C), we also run 
multivariate (mostly logistic) regressions using these characteristics as independent variables. To simplify 
exposition and for brevity, we present the full set of univariate results in subsequent tables (see, e.g., 
Graham and Harvey, 2001, or Brau and Fawcett, 2006), but relegate multivariate regressions and 
alternative statistical tests to the Internet Appendix. We generally only report conclusions if they are robust 
to the full set of specifications and tests (that we also describe at the appropriate places below).  
One of the concerns that can threaten the validity of the survey method is that respondents may 
systematically differ from non-respondents (see, e.g., Armstrong and Overton, 1977; Wallace and Mellor, 
1988). In Table D, as suggested by Moore and Reichert (1983), we compare the characteristics of 
“surveyed” firms and “invited” firms. Of our 115 responses, more than half (55%) were from German-
speaking countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), which is relatively more than the proportion of 
firms from German-speaking countries among the overall selected sample (31%). Compared to the invited 
companies from Worldscope, the firms in our sample also have somewhat higher sales. This size disparity 
is not surprising given that survey response rates from large firms are frequently higher than those from 
small firms (Dennis, 2003).4 Although our sample may not fully represent the distribution of firms with 
respect to size, it may do well in capturing the behavior of the major firms in the economy. We also check 
variables with metric scales other than size (operating segments, debt ratio) and find no significant 
difference between sample and population averages. Finally, we compare responses from early (the first 
50 percent) and late respondents (the last 50 percent) and find no meaningful differences in responses 
across these groups.5   
[Insert Table A, B, C, D here] 
3 The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation   
Most of the firm’s financial policy decisions—such as capital structure or payout decisions—are 
centralized at the level of headquarters with limited involvement of lower-level divisional management 
(Jennergren, 1981; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2015). Capital allocation and investment decisions are very 
different, however. Divisional managers possess private information that is not readily available to top 
                                                 
4 This tendency is also present in comparable surveys targeting financial executives (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; 
Dichev et al., 2013).  
5 We perform chi-square tests of differences in responses for both groups and each of the sixty-eight questions not related to 
demographics. Three of them are statistically different across the two groups of firms at the 5% level. 
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management but that is crucial to the efficient allocation of capital. The importance of local information 
at the level of divisions favors the delegation of investment authority from higher levels to lower ones and 
the involvement of divisions in the capital allocation process. But the benefits of the use of local 
information come with agency costs. Divisional managers may have preferences different from those of 
top management, which likely results in opportunistic behavior and the distortion of capital allocation at 
the divisional level.  
Firms have substantial flexibility in how to organize the process of capital allocation and the careful design 
of the allocation process can potentially mitigate the consequences of these frictions while largely 
incorporating divisional management’s private information (see also Stein, 2003): firms typically balance 
between centralization and decentralization of investment decisions, frequently assign budget limits, 
establish different layers of approval, and implement mechanisms to mitigate information biases. We 
examine these mechanisms in the following sections, but begin with the analysis of problems of agency 
and information inside firms. Although these frictions are fundamental problems of corporate investment 
(and the central postulate of most capital allocation theories), little is known about the extent to which 
they are perceived inside firms. We provide evidence by posing direct questions to CFOs.  
3.1 Asymmetric Information and Agency Problems Inside the Firm 
Capital allocation theories typically suggest that divisional management has private information about 
their businesses (e.g., Harris, Kriebel and Raviv, 1982; Antle and Eppen, 1985). Indeed, 71% of CFOs 
agree or strongly agree that divisional management is better informed about their divisions’ businesses 
than headquarters (Table 1) confirming the need for a bottom-up component in the capital allocation 
process. Interestingly, the informational disadvantage of headquarters relative to divisional management 
is significantly larger if diversification is unrelated (80.0% of unrelated diversified firms agree or strongly 
agree vs. 63.9% of related diversified firms), which supports the view that informational asymmetries 
inside the firm increase as the firm grows in scope (Chandler, 1962; Aghion and Tirole, 1997).  
Divisional management’s superior information alone is not sufficient for inefficiencies. If incentives 
between headquarters and divisional management were aligned, divisional managers would act in the best 
interests of headquarters. Personal objectives of divisional management frequently lead to weak incentives 
to maximize firm value, manifesting themselves in, e.g., empire building, influencing activities and 
lobbying, lack of effort, entrenchment, or perk consumption. Our survey examines the types of within-
firm conflicts of interest frequently associated with affecting capital allocation and directly asks how CFOs 
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assess the divergence of objectives between headquarters and divisional management. CFOs were asked 
to score on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) how strongly they concur with a 
set of statements about moral hazard at the divisional level. Understanding the types of moral hazard inside 
firms is important for researchers trying to model capital allocation in firms and offer solutions for 
minimizing agency costs. Fig. 1 and Table 1 summarize the results.  
 
  
  
Overall, our results imply (and confirm) that different forms of agency problems have a legitimate role in 
theoretical models of internal capital allocation. There is no single, dominant moral hazard problem at the 
level of divisions that executives perceive as more relevant than all others.6 For instance, we ask CFOs 
whether divisional management would feel more committed to raising the firm’s attractiveness to capital 
markets if they were running a standalone firm (de Motta, 2003). Almost two-thirds of CFOs (62%) agree 
or strongly agree, which supports the view of misaligned preferences between top management and 
divisional management with respect to increasing firm value. Divisional managers may also have 
preferences for building large empires (Jensen 1986, 1993; Hart and Moore, 1995) or may engage in 
wasteful influencing activities and lobbying as a result of intra-firm bargaining for resources (Milgrom, 
                                                 
6 We perform McNemar’s test for the analysis of paired dichotomous variables to examine whether ratings of sub-questions 
are statistically different or whether differences arise by chance (see, e.g., Table 1, Panel A, last column). For instance, the 
ratings of the three most common types of moral hazard (see Fig. 1) are not statistically different, but each of the ratings differs 
statistically from the least common rating (11%, “work harder”). We conduct these pairwise tests throughout for all survey 
questions with answers that allow a rank-order interpretation (see the survey questions in Tables 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14) to 
avoid misinterpretation of their relative importance if ratings are statistically similar. See McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) 
and Dichev et al. (2013) for related tests.    
Fig. 1: Survey evidence on the question (n=106): “If another corporate manager made the following statements, how 
strongly would you agree or disagree with each of them when you think about the divisional management in your 
company?” We ask executives to indicate their level of agreement with these arguments on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 
denoting “strongly disagree” and 5 denoting “strongly agree.” 
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1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A 
majority of financial executives confirm the empire-building tendencies of divisional managers and their 
attempts to influence headquarters’ decisions in their favor (56% each). Interestingly, influencing 
activities by divisional management are more severe if empire-building tendencies are high (67.8% vs. 
40.4%). This complementarity result supports the theoretical foundations of influencing models of capital 
allocation. For instance, in Scharfstein and Stein’s (2000) model, empire-building preferences lead to 
influencing activities of divisional management to attract more capital to the own division.  
Capital allocation models also hypothesize that the capital allocation process diminishes entrepreneurial 
incentives (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Brusco and Panunzi, 2005; 
Seru, 2014) because headquarters can reallocate funds across divisions, which may decrease incentives to 
generate these funds ex-ante. Forty-three percent of financial executives agree or strongly agree that 
divisions would behave more entrepreneurial if divisional management were running their divisions as 
standalone companies. Surprisingly, only 11% of CFOs believe that insufficient provision of effort at the 
divisional level is prevalent in their firm. Thus, withholding effort, e.g., in the form of working hours, 
seems to be of second-order importance relative to other forms of moral hazard at the level of divisional 
management.   
When further examining the interrelation between agency problems and capital budgeting below, we 
employ a composite measure of the perceived level of within-firm agency problems. We average the score 
of the above five ratings and use the median score as the cutoff point to classify firms into high- and low-
agency cost firms. Details on the construction of the agency measure are set forth in the Appendix. As we 
document below, agency problems have a profound influence on the organization of capital allocation. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We begin our analysis of capital allocation by examining the allocation of investment authority between 
headquarters and divisions. The allocation of investment authority consists of a set of instruments and 
corporate policies that abstract from the individual investment project, but hold for investment in general. 
Specifically, we examine the allocation of investment authority to lower levels of the organization (or 
delegation) via budget limits and layers of approval. Subsequently, we study whether and how firms 
implement curative mechanisms proposed by the theoretical literature to mitigate information biases or to 
reduce informational asymmetry.   
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3.2 Project Authorization and the Delegation of Authority 
3.2.1 Major Investments: Decision-Making Authority and Approval Thresholds  
Investments typically require top management approval if they materially affect the business as a whole, 
which may be determined by the size (Gitman and Forrester, 1977) or nature (Marshuetz, 1985) of a single 
project. We ask CFOs whether decision-making authority for major investments resides at headquarters 
(Table 2, row 1). CFOs consistently report that major investment decisions are not delegated to lower level 
management. Headquarters retains decision-making authority over major investments in nearly all firms 
(97%), which also confirms the role of headquarters as the centralized provider of finance (see also Bower, 
1970; Myers, 1984; Stanley and Block, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1996).  
Previous literature also documents that firms often use approval procedures that include formal investment 
thresholds (see also Bower, 1970; Ross, 1986; Brealey and Myers, 2003, p. 312): divisions are authorized 
to make investment decisions within budget limits without headquarters’ consent if capital expenditures 
for a project are below a certain level, but headquarters’ approval is required for large investments. From 
a theoretical standpoint, these thresholds are an efficient way to solve agency and information problems 
between headquarters and divisional managers either by reducing auditing costs if the information is 
verifiable (Harris and Raviv, 1996 and 1998; Malenko, 2016) or by facilitating the separation of good and 
bad proposals if it is not (Marino and Matsusaka, 2005). Indeed, there is a widespread use of approval 
thresholds. Nearly all firms (97%) indicate they use such threshold levels.    
[Insert Table 2 and 3 here] 
We also ask CFOs to report the threshold levels that trigger central approval. We summarize these facts 
in Fig. 2 and Table 3.7 The mean (median) threshold level is €5 million (€0.5 million); threshold levels 
range from €0.001 million to €65 million. From the boxplot in Fig. 2, we can discern that there is a clear 
tendency for threshold levels to increase with the size of capital expenditures.8 Median threshold levels 
rise from €100,000 to €5 million as we move from the bottom to the top group of firms. A similar tendency 
is also given with respect to firm size (shown in the Internet Appendix, Fig. C.1). The median threshold 
level in the group of small firms is €100,000, whereas it is €2 million in the group of large firms.   
                                                 
7 Only 80 of 115 firms provided data on threshold levels, perhaps because of confidentiality concerns. 
8 In the figure, we display boxplots of investment threshold levels for different size categories of capital expenditures. The solid 
line within each box represents the median, whereas the box gives the interquartile range (i.e., the middle half of the distribution 
between the first and third quartile). 
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3.2.2 Division Budgets 
Despite the importance of headquarters for major corporate investment decisions, firms partially delegate 
investment authority to their divisional managers in the capital budgeting process. Headquarters typically 
assigns budgets for its divisions; within budget limits division managers have capital investment 
autonomy. CFOs report that a noteworthy average of 39% of annual capital expenditures do not require 
higher-level investment approval by headquarters (see Table 4, row 1). This result is surprisingly high, 
indicating that firms provide divisions with considerable discretion about how to spend the firm’s capital; 
firms delegate a large portion of their overall investments to divisional management.9 This finding also 
demonstrates that capital allocation involves more than bottom-up project initiation and top-down capital 
allocation, as many finance textbooks suggest (see Brealey and Myers, 2003): substantial investment 
authority resides decentralized at lower levels of the organization.10  
When we examine firm characteristics that are associated with the fraction of overall capital expenditures 
that divisions can make without explicit signoff (i.e., the degree or extent of delegation/decentralization), 
                                                 
9 A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that for S&P 500 firms (2000-2015), 39% of annual capital expenditures imply 
an interquartile range from $25mn to $250mn in absolute terms. 
10 See also Seru (2014), who examines the relationship between decentralized R&D budgets and innovation using survey data. 
Fig. 2: Investment Thresholds and Capital Expenditures: Figure 2 displays boxplots of investment threshold levels for 
different size categories of capital expenditures (in Euro). The solid line (the cross symbol) within each box represents 
the median (mean), whereas the box gives the interquartile range (i.e., the middle half of the distribution between the 
first and third quartile). Threshold levels on the vertical axis are measured on a logarithmic scale.  
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we find this number is significantly higher for large firms than for small firms (45.7% vs. 28.9%). Theories 
of firm size and scope can explain this result. As firm size expands, local information becomes more costly 
to aggregate and transmit through the hierarchy (Bloom, Sadun and van Reenen, 2010; Garicano, 2000). 
Top management is also time constrained over the investment decisions they can make (Penrose, 1959; 
Chandler, 1962), which favors the decentralization of the investment decision to divisional management 
if firms are large. We also find that divisional budgets are significantly smaller for firms whose CFOs 
report substantial agency conflicts between headquarters and divisional management (31.6% vs. 44.2%). 
This difference between the two groups is economically significant and supports the central prediction of 
theories of decentralization: agency problems reduce the level of delegation, and hence headquarters seeks 
to retain decision-making control (see, e.g., Dessein, 2002). Finally, the CFOs of high debt-ratio firms 
report significantly lower levels of decentralization than CFOs of low debt-ratio firms do (31.3% vs. 
44.5%). To the extent that debt disciplines top management (Jensen, 1986), this result supports the view 
of a negative relation between high-powered incentives at the level of headquarters and the level of 
decentralization inside the firm (Hart and Holmström, 2010).11   
Overall, our results strongly support inferences made by theories of decentralization (see, e.g., Bloom, 
Sadun and van Reenen, 2012) that suggest a tradeoff between the benefits of the efficient use of local 
information (e.g., lower information acquisition and processing cost) and its costs of agency (e.g., loss of 
control/empire-building, monitoring cost). Our conditioning analysis provides evidence that firms balance 
these benefits and costs of decentralization (or delegation) when allocating capital. The on-average results 
also demonstrate that the extent to which firms delegate investment authority via divisional budgets is 
relatively high: a large fraction of overall capital investments does not require explicit investment approval 
by headquarters. 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
3.3 Information Aggregation and Information Production   
To reach high-quality investment decisions for major investments, firms use local private information 
provided via investments proposals and aggregate this information at the level of corporate headquarters 
(e.g., Radner, 1992 and 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994). Investment proposals typically contain cash 
                                                 
11 For robustness, we also perform regression models with the percentage of expenditures that managers spend without approval 
as the dependent variable and the conditioning variables as controls. These regression models confirm the results from the 
univariate tests in terms of both their statistical and their economic significance. The Internet Appendix reports the full results.  
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flow projections, financial analyses, and backup information; they are frequently initiated bottom-up by 
the divisions. We are interested in examining the extent to which headquarters relies on these reports of 
divisions’ private information or whether headquarters relies instead, at least in part, on other methods to 
elicit private information from divisional managers. Before examining such organizational responses, we 
provide some basic facts about the information aggregation process through investment proposals.   
3.3.1 Information Aggregation via Investment Proposals 
Table 3 displays the number of investment proposals that operating divisions submit to headquarters in an 
average year. The number of proposals ranges between 2 and 300 projects,12 with 20 proposals per year 
for the median firm and 36 proposals on average. Small firms have a median of 18 investment proposals, 
compared to 25 proposals in large firms. This seemingly low number of proposals for the median firms is 
intuitive considering arguments of management time constraints and CEO overload. When headquarters 
insists on reviewing and approving major projects, it limits the number of capital projects that can be 
reviewed (see Levy and Sarnat, 1994, p. 96 and the literature on information processing under 
management time constraints, e.g., Crémer, 1980; Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991). We also examine 
project acceptance rates and ask executives which percentage of these proposals receives final approval 
(see Table 4, row 2). Our results indicate that project screening is not a “formal” process. The average 
acceptance rate for investment proposals is 78%, which does not vary conditional on different firm 
characteristics.  
However, constraints on management time are not the only frictions that top management face when 
processing information provided by divisional management. It is well known that managers have 
incentives to manipulate financial projections to achieve larger-than-efficient resource allocations or more 
favorable evaluation benchmarks (Stein, 1997; Antle and Fellingham, 1997; Bernardo, Cai, and Luo, 
2001). Managerial overconfidence may also lead divisional management to systematically overestimate 
the returns on their investment projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2006). The financial executives in our 
study are aware of these distortions and know that information from divisional management is likely to be 
biased. Nearly all executives (98.2%) report that divisions provide detailed financial information (such as 
cash flow forecasts or NPV calculations) as part of their investment proposals (see Table 5). However, 
only approximately one-third of these executives consider forecasts to be relatively reliable (see Table 6). 
                                                 
12 We omit one outlier firm that reported an average of 4,500 investment proposals per year. 
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More than half the executives (50.9%) indicate that cash flow and net present value (NPV) forecasts are 
biased upwards—i.e., higher or substantially higher—than actual outcomes.  
Because investment distortions from misrepresentation of information can be significant, potential 
remedies for such distortions have been a matter of long-standing interest in the literature.13 In the 
following section, we examine the practices that firms use to alleviate this problem of control.  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]  
3.3.2 Capital Budgeting Mechanisms for Eliciting Truthful Reporting of Private 
Information 
Scholars in management accounting and finance have proposed a variety of curative mechanisms that can 
ensure that divisional managers provide truthful information (see Stein, 2003, p. 143 or Haka, 2006 for an 
overview). Yet it has remained largely unclear whether and to what extent these schemes are employed in 
practice. We examine the relative importance of various mechanisms proposed by previous research and 
ask CFOs to rate them on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important).14 Fig. 3 and Table 7 
summarize the results.  
[Insert Table 7 here]  
The financial executives in our sample state that the most important control mechanism for motivating 
truthful representation in the budgeting process is making divisional managers’ compensation a function 
of overall firm performance. Seventy-three percent of CFOs find this mechanism very or highly important. 
For instance, Loeb and Magat (1978), Groves and Loeb (1979), Cohen and Loeb (1984), Antle and 
Fellingham (1997), or Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2004) posit that sharing the entire firm’s profit with 
divisional management provides the appropriate incentives to achieve truthful forecasts. Such 
compensation tied to the firm’s overall performance puts the divisional manager in an owner-like position. 
Interestingly, the scheme is relatively less important for firms with many lines of business (66.0% vs. 
78.0%, see also Internet Appendix C.4, column 1), which is consistent with the argument that free-rider 
                                                 
13 Compared to the problem of misrepresentation of private information, managerial overconfidence is relatively impervious to 
potential measures that mitigate its consequences (see Stein, 2003, p. 123). 
14 The survey questions isolate from the possibility that firms employ a particular design scheme for reasons other than for 
truthful reporting. For instance, firms use hurdle rates in excess of the firm’s real cost of capital to induce divisional managers 
to report truthfully (e.g., Antle and Eppen, 1985), but they impose them also, e.g., to account for real-option-like characteristics 
of investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 7; Jagannathan et al., 2016 for other motives). The survey question requests: “If 
you use these practices for other reasons and not for truthful reporting, please check ‘Not important’.”   
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problems make profit sharing less effective with an increasing number of projects (see, e.g., Baker, Jensen, 
and Murphy, 1988). 
Another highly rated measure to curb misrepresentation is to require investment proposals with 
information that is verifiable by headquarters (68.8%) (see Stein, 2002). Such hard, easy-to-verify 
information is important because headquarters can then audit investment proposals to discover the true 
productivities of capital (Harris and Raviv, 1996 and 1998). Interestingly, firms find this measure 
relatively more important if they report high agency problems (76.7% vs. 63.8%).  
      
We also examine whether firms use inflated hurdle rates to correct for the misrepresentation of private 
information. This argument is related to the literature on capital rationing. Firms trade off foregone profits 
of marginally profitable projects with the costs of eliciting private information (informational rents) that 
must be paid to divisional managers (Antle and Eppen, 1985; Antle and Fellingham, 1997). More than 
half (53.2%) of executives use inflated hurdle rates in excess of the “true” cost of capital to avoid 
misrepresentation of private information. Large firms find this measure relatively more important (64.6% 
vs. 36.4%).  
73%
69%
53%
44%
33%
24%
22%
17%
13%
11%
24%
26%
24%
21%
39%
33%
29%
20%
100%90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%
We rotate divisional managers across divisions.
The proportion of performance-based pay relative to 
base salary is high if a manager claims better 
expected investment prospects.
We adopt criteria that discount distant long-horizon 
cash flows more heavily than  does the NPV method.
We put a high weight on industry Information that is
gathered externally compared to internal information.
We grant each division a minimum level of
capital budget / investment.
We have institutionalized post-investment audits.
We set the required hurdle rate for project approval 
in excess of the "true" cost of capital.
We require managers to produce investment
proposals that can be verified by headquarters.
We link the performance-based pay of divisional 
managers to overall firm performance.
Percentage of CFOs who identify a practice as moderately important (3) to ensure truthful reporting
Percentage of CFOs who identify a practice as very/highly important (4/5) to ensure truthful reporting
Fig. 3: Survey evidence on the question (n=109): “How important are the following business practices in your 
company to ensure that divisional managers provide truthful forecasts and do not overstate the attractiveness of 
investment projects? If you use these practices for other reasons and not for truthful reporting, please check ‘Not 
Important’.” 
17 
 
Other methods of eliminating managers’ misrepresentation of private information include ex post control 
mechanisms such as institutionalized post-investment audits. Ex post information production may be less 
costly than capital rationing to mitigate ex ante information problems (Antle and Eppen, 1985). Our results 
indicate that post-audits of investment projects are less common than intuition may suggest. Only 44% of 
firms report using post-audits to motivate truthful representations. The result is interesting because 
previous research indicates that post-audits can outperform other mechanisms at inducing truth-telling 
(Magee, 1980 for an analytical approach; Chow, Hwang, and Liao, 2000 in an experimental setting). One 
possible explanation for this reluctance to employ post-audits is that firms are frequently unwilling to 
abandon capital projects (Jensen, 1993), for instance, because of top managers’ career concerns (Kanodia, 
Bushman, and Dickhaut, 1989; Staw, 1976). Interestingly, the auditing of capital projects is significantly 
more important for firms with many lines of business (62.0% vs. 28.8%).  
Other practices that may help firms address information problems are less frequently important. For 
instance, Ozbas (2005) argues that rigid divisional capital budgets and job rotation programs can improve 
divisional managers’ incentives for truthful communication with headquarters. Indeed, 33.0% and 12.8% 
of firms find these arguments very or highly important. Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001, 2004) propose 
explicit incentives for divisional managers. In the authors’ optimal compensation contract, the proportion 
of performance-based pay relative to base salary is high if divisional managers claim better expected 
investment prospects. Such flexible and information-sensitive contract designs at the divisional level are 
important for approximately one-sixth (17.4%) of firms. 
4 Capital Investment in Internal Capital Markets 
4.1 Decision Rules of Capital Allocation 
In the next section, we examine capital budgeting methods and decision rules, both formal and informal 
ones. Unlike previous studies that investigate formal decision rules to evaluate projects (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Trahan and Gitman, 1995; Bierman, 1993), our focus is on dimensions that are specific to 
firms whose divisions seek funds through internal capital markets. Subsequently, we examine informal 
budgeting measures. Among these measures are the assessment of managerial abilities and strategic 
information of top management when allocating capital to certain businesses, and there is considerable 
anecdotal evidence that the use of these rules is common. As we show, their relative importance is strongly 
associated with our measure of agency problems between top management and divisional management. 
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4.1.1 Financial Analysis, Formal Decision Rules, and Bottom-up Measures 
We first asked CFOs to indicate the relative importance of the standard capital budgeting decision rules 
recommended by finance textbooks, including NPV, IRR, hurdle rate, payback period, sensitivity analysis, 
and real-option valuation methods. CFOs were asked to score the importance that they attribute to the 
different budgeting techniques on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 denoting “not important” and 5 denoting “very 
important.” Our sample results are summarized in Fig. 4 and Table 8. 
IRR, NPV, payback period, and sensitivity analyses are the CFOs’ most widely used techniques to allocate 
funds. Approximately two-thirds of our respondents rate this cluster of factors as very or highly important 
in their decisions to provide divisions with capital. Only 37% of firms find hurdle rates very or highly 
important. Interestingly, firms in our sample rarely apply real-option methods. Very few firms—only 
seven in the sample (6%)—find real-option methods very or highly important in evaluating investment 
projects. The overall results about the budgeting techniques employed are in line with Graham and 
Harvey’s (2001) survey of US firms. Our study also confirms the authors’ findings on the importance of 
the payback period despite its shortcomings (e.g., no discounting of cash flows, bias toward short-lived 
projects). 
      
[Insert Table 8 here] 
70%
70%
64%
64%
37%
6%
18%
16%
22%
17%
26%
17%
10%0% 50%30% 40%20% 60% 70% 90%80% 100%
Real-option valuation methods
Sensitivity analysis
Payback period
Hurdle rate
Net present value (NPV)
Internal rate of return (IRR)
Percentage of CFOs who identify a budgeting criteria as very/highly important (4/5)
Percentage of CFOs who identify a budgeting criteria as moderately important (3)
Fig. 4: Survey evidence on the question (n=115): “How important are the following financial criteria for your capital 
allocation decision?” 
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However, the relative importance of individual budgeting techniques is different in the cross-section of 
firms. The analysis puts forth a set of novel results, particularly with respect to firms that operate unrelated 
businesses. Unrelated diversifiers rank payback period as the most important budgeting technique 
(80.0%), with NPV as the next closest at 66.0%. IRR is relatively less important (60.0%) for these firms. 
One possible explanation for the prominence of the payback technique for firms with unrelated businesses 
is related to the degree of information problems between the corporate center and its business divisions. 
If divisions operate in unrelated businesses, informational asymmetries are likely more pronounced 
because headquarters is frequently less knowledgeable about the foundations of divisional investment 
proposals. Therefore, headquarters may want to adopt payback rules to place more weight on near-term 
cash flows that can signal the true project quality in the short run and thus contradict a divisional manager’s 
ex ante evaluation of a capital project at an early stage (see also Bernardo, Cai, and Luo, 2001). If cash 
flows are below forecasts, the firm can force corrective actions, such as abandoning poorly performing 
investments. Thus, our findings may suggest that the payback criterion can protect especially firms with 
unrelated businesses against problems of informational asymmetry. We find further evidence for this 
postulate in unreported analysis. The payback period is rated as the most important technique among firms 
that indicate a strong informational advantage in favor of divisional managers (68.0% vs. 48.4%).  
We also look at the importance of IRR and control for the relatedness of divisions. The relatively low 
prominence of IRR for unrelated diversified firms relative to related diversified firms (60.0% vs. 78.5%) 
may stem from the incompleteness of the criterion when comparing unrelated businesses whose systematic 
risks differ significantly. Whereas the (isolated) use of IRR can be acceptable if systematic risks of 
competing projects are similar, its application may be particularly costly if businesses differ significantly, 
which is likely in the case of diversified firms with unrelated businesses.15   
Furthermore, our survey reveals that firms with low credit ratings are significantly more likely to find 
payback periods important (74.2% vs. 31.8%). To the extent that ratings proxy for financial capacity, our 
result suggests that capital-constrained firms may emphasize liquidity in their budgeting decision and rank 
projects according to their ability to generate cash quickly (see Pike, 1983; Weston and Brigham 1993, p. 
69).  
Conditional analysis further reveals that hurdle rates are relatively less important for firms that report 
capital constraints (45.0% vs. 20.0%). This result is intuitive. When resources are limited, projects 
                                                 
15 See Gup and Norwood III. (1982), Fuller and Kerr (1981), or Weston (1973) for the use of divisional costs of capital in multi-
division firms. 
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compete for their share of a fixed amount of capital. Therefore, firms are not able to undertake all NPV-
positive projects, and the approval decision should be based on the relative profitability of the projects. 
However, because hurdle rates are the minimum rates of return that capital projects must meet to receive 
guaranteed funding, it may be less useful for capital-constrained firms; the firm would have to employ an 
iterative process of determining the hurdle rate that matches capital supply and demand. Finally, CFO 
characteristics are important for the budgeting measure of choice. CFOs with short tenures find NPV 
(79.3% vs. 59.6%) and sensitivity analyses (74.1% vs. 54.4%) relatively more important than their peers 
with long tenures. 
4.1.2 Informal Decision Rules and Top-Down Measures 
We also asked CFOs explicitly about the informal decision rules that they apply in their capital allocation 
decisions and find surprising results (see Fig. 5 and Table 9). Remarkably, CFOs rate the three most 
important “soft” measures affecting capital allocation larger in absolute magnitude than all the financial 
measures mentioned above. Overall, these three rules are perceived as nearly similar in relevance, namely, 
“strategic information of headquarters” (82.6%), the “assessment of divisional managers' abilities” 
(79.1%), and the firm’s “ability to execute projects” (79.1%). When including these soft factors, IRR 
(70.4%) and NPV (69.6%), the most prominent financial measures, rank only fourth and fifth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83%
79%
79%
52%
43%
12%
16%
15%
30%
38%
100%90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%
Previous industry experience or affiliation of 
decision-makers at headquarters
Current market trends
Ability to execute projects (e.g., manpower,
knowledge)
The assessment of divisional managers' 
abilities to deliver the expected results
Strategic information of top management
Percentage of CFOs who identify a criteria as moderately important (3)
Percentage of CFOs who identify a criteria as very/highly important (4/5)
Fig. 5: Survey evidence on the question (n=115): “How important are the following factors that go beyond pure 
financial criteria for your capital allocation decision?” 
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Whereas the absolute magnitude of these scores may seem surprising at first sight, it likely captures the 
notion that the capital investment process reflects not only the bottom-up view of divisional management 
(through investment proposals) but also the top-down perspective of a firm’s corporate center (see also 
Brealey and Myers, 2003, p. 314).16 The finance literature has focused on this notion only recently. There 
is extensive literature on how information and agency problems influence the bottom-up budgeting 
process because division managers have better information about their businesses than their superiors, but 
it is also headquarters that uses its own “strategic information” in the investment process (Hoang and 
Ruckes, 2015; Almazan, Chen, and Titman, 2017). Such informational advantages of headquarters may 
result from top management’s activities beyond the realm of the firm (Mintzberg, 1975) and/or from its 
ability to see the “big picture” across all its divisions. This ability implies better information on such issues 
as potential spillovers, strategic intentions, or implications on the corporation as a whole. Regardless of 
the source of strategic information, top management uses this information extensively in the budgeting 
process. Our analysis further reveals that relying on headquarters’ strategic information in the budgeting 
process is more important if agency problems at the level of divisional management are high (88.6% vs. 
75.8%).  This result suggests that the informational input provided by divisions may be less relevant for 
allocation decisions if incentives between top management and division management are misaligned.  
Another important factor is the firm’s “assessment of divisional managers’ abilities” to deliver expected 
results. Seventy-nine percent of CFOs find this argument very or highly important. This finding is 
interesting. Although there is anecdotal evidence that headquarters’ opinion of divisional managers’ 
ability (to successfully implement an approved project or to cautiously compile proposals) is crucial in the 
investment process (Ross, 1986; Bower, 2005),17 relatively little is known about its role in the budgeting 
process. One exception is Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015), who find that the reputation of the divisional 
manager is the second most important factor in the investment process after NPV.18 Additionally, Hoang 
                                                 
16 As Brealey and Myers (2003, p. 314) note, “A firm's capital investment choices should reflect both bottom-up and top-down 
processes. (...) Plant and division managers, who do most of the work in bottom-up capital budgeting, may not see the forest 
for the trees. Strategic planners may have a mistaken view of the forest because they do not look at the trees one by one” (see 
also Bower, 1970, p. 334-338 and Roberts, 2005, p. 397). 
17 Bower (2005, p. 31) writes, “It is the track record of the general manager in the middle who signs the proposal that determines 
the way the projections and calculations it contains are regarded. In fact, when they pick up a proposal, top managers usually 
look first for the name on the signature line before reading anything else. […].” Bower (2005, p. 31-32) further notes that 
“particularly in multi-business or high-technology companies, […] top management may have little basis […] of the detailed 
foundations of the proposal. […] Top corporate officers behave like bankers who provide funds based on the reliability of the 
borrowers.” See also Carter (1971, p. 426). 
18 The role of divisional managers’ characteristics in the budgeting process was studied only recently. Duchin and Sosyura 
(2013) and Gaspar and Massa (2011) examine the effect of divisional managers’ (social) connections to the CEO on capital 
allocations. See also Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sautner (2013) who show that the political power of divisional managers 
influences the distribution of cash windfalls across divisions. 
22 
 
and Ruckes (2015) suggest that top management holds a private assessment of its divisional managers’ 
level of ability to successfully implement new projects. We further find that in diversified firms with 
unrelated divisions, the proportion of CFOs perceiving such assessments as very or highly important is 
significantly higher than in firms with related divisions (88.0% vs. 72.3%). Therefore, headquarters 
appears to rely strongly on additional human-capital-related signals if lines of business are relatively 
diverse and therefore informational asymmetries between divisions and the corporate center can be high. 
Finally, the assessment of divisional managers’ abilities is relatively more important if within-firm agency 
problems are perceived to be large (86.4% vs. 74.1%). Hence, analogous to the conditional use of its 
strategic information (see previous paragraph), headquarters puts more weight on its own high-level 
judgment the more severe agency problems are.  
Another 79% of survey participants state that the “ability to execute projects” is very or highly important, 
indicating that operative and non-capital constraints are equally relevant to corporate investment. This 
result is consistent with both the arguments made by Levy and Sarnat (1994, p. 96) and Pike (1983) and 
the field evidence of Bromiley (1986, p. 129). These studies argue that the supply of profitable investments 
can exceed a company’s ability to implement them due to, for instance, the limited supply of skilled labor 
or senior management’s capacity to approve and review projects. Therefore, both capital access and the 
availability of implementation resources can significantly influence investment. In this respect, (good) 
projects compete not only for their share of a potentially limited capital budget but also for scarce non-
capital resources that are potentially devoted to other projects.   
Furthermore, more than half (52%) of the respondents consider following “current market trends” as very 
or highly important. This evidence is moderately strong, and the finding is consistent with “herding” 
arguments. Decision makers look at the decisions previously made by other decision makers either 
because of reputational concerns (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) or because previous movers have relevant 
information (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992).19 Following market trends is 
significantly less important for pure conglomerates, i.e., firms with unrelated diversification (40.0% vs. 
61.5%). This result may reflect that ignoring market trends is relatively more costly for related diversified 
firms (whose market opportunities are positively correlated across divisions) if market opportunities 
realize positively and competitors succeed.  
Finally, 43% of CFOs indicate that “previous industry experience or affiliation of decision makers at 
headquarters” plays an important role in capital allocation. Even though we cannot pinpoint its directional 
                                                 
19 Several financial executives in our pre-testing group stress the importance of following long-term industry trends. 
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effect (i.e., favoritism vs. reverse favoritism), this finding is consistent with the discussion in Xuan (2009) 
in the sense that decision makers’ job histories are important determinants of internal capital allocation. 
The result is particularly interesting given that executives confess potentially undesirable behavior during 
the budgeting process. 
[Insert Table 9 here]  
4.2 Capital Reallocation Policies in Internal Capital Markets and the 
Interaction with Corporate Financing 
We devote the final part of our paper to within-firm capital reallocation, a key feature of internal capital 
markets. A considerable body of research points out that internal capital markets can be more or less 
efficient in allocating capital than external capital markets (see the literature surveys Stein, 2003 and 
Gertner and Scharfstein, 2013), but the measurement of capital reallocation activities with accounting data 
generally represents an empirical challenge (see Maksimovic and Philips, 2007 and 2013). Our survey 
aims to circumvent some of the obstacles encountered in previous studies by providing direct evidence of 
the reallocation of capital in internal capital markets. Our main area of interest is the study of “corporate 
socialism,” the much-discussed hypothesis of a potential bias in capital allocation in internal capital 
markets (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Matvos and Seru, 2014). We 
analyze the prevalence of possible distortions in capital allocation and the importance of several alternative 
hypotheses that aim to explain such firm policies.  
We conclude with examining the interaction between internal capital allocation and financing. A growing 
empirical literature suggests several channels through which replacing the external capital market by an 
internal capital market may affect corporate financing. However, it has remained largely unexplored, 
which of these factors are considered most important by financial executives.    
4.2.1 Winner-Picking and Corporate Socialism 
To examine the (re)allocative efficiency of internal capital markets, we directly ask how frequently firms 
engage in so-called “winner-picking” (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997) by moving 
financial resources from divisions that are generating strong cash flow to divisions with less cash flow but 
strong investment opportunities to achieve the highest capital productivity (Table 10, row 1; 1=never, 
2=rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=always). The survey evidence provides strong support for such 
“winner-picking” (Stein, 1997) across divisions. Indeed, 84% of CFOs report that they sometimes, often, 
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or always use the ability to redeploy cash flows toward divisions with relatively favorable investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, 52% of firms always or often “winner-pick,” and only 1.7% of firms say they 
never do so. Thus, our evidence indicates that top management utilizes its decision authority to pursue 
value-enhancing reallocations across divisions (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004; Khanna and Tice, 2001). 
Firms that frequently (i.e., sometimes, often, or always) engage in winner-picking also generate a higher 
number of investment proposals in the investment process (see Section 3.3.1). In the group of firms that 
generate many proposals, 94% engage in winner-picking, compared to 75% in the group of firms that 
generate few (untabulated). In addition, large firms (89.6% vs. 77.1% for small firms), financially 
constrained firms (91.4% vs. 81.3% for unconstrained firms, see also Internet Appendix C.8), and firms 
with low levels of agency problems (90.3% vs. 79.5% for firms with high levels of agency problems, see 
also Internet Appendix C.8) tend to engage in winner-picking more frequently.  
Despite these apparent benefits of internal capital markets, some studies posit that multi-divisional firms 
allocate capital inefficiently among business units. For instance, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), 
Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010), and Matvos and Seru (2014) argue that firms frequently favor divisions 
with poor growth opportunities at the expense of those with good opportunities and therefore seem to 
knowingly move capital allocation toward an even distribution across divisions (“corporate socialism”). 
However, because these empirical studies are not free of measurement and endogeneity issues20, the 
debate about whether and why firms potentially engage in such investment behavior has not been resolved. 
With our survey instrument, we are able to bypass some of these issues.  
We first examine the existence of socialism in internal capital markets. We ask CFOs on a scale of 1 to 5 
about how frequently they allocate financial resources more evenly than pure financial criteria suggest 
(1=never, 2=rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=always) and obtain interesting results. According to our 
study, a large proportion of firms acknowledges and practices corporate socialism. Nearly half (47%) of 
the financial executives surveyed sometimes, often, or always cross-subsidize with a balanced capital 
allocation across divisions. Furthermore, 24% of the respondents indicate that they never engage in 
corporate socialism. These numbers contrast with recent results from Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015), 
who find that 6-18% of CFOs engage in corporate socialism.21 Therefore, our findings suggest that 
                                                 
20 See Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2013) for a comprehensive discussion of these issues in 
the literature on internal capital markets. 
21 Their question design is somewhat different, however. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) ask, “Which of the following factors 
are important in your allocation of capital across divisions?” The survey response “Moving towards an even balance of capital 
allocation across divisions” is designed to capture the notion of corporate socialism. In their study, 7% (6%) of U.S. CEOs 
(CFOs) and 14% (18%) of non-U.S. CEOs (CFOs) say that a balanced allocation is important.  
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socialism is prevalent and not a statistical artifact of the data. Additionally, our results are relatively 
homogeneous across firms, and there is no difference in the prevalence of socialism conditional on firm 
or executive characteristics.  
We further examine the pervasiveness of socialism conditional on firms engaging frequently in winner-
picking. We distinguish between “infrequent” winner-pickers (Table 10, row 1; 1=never, 2=rarely) and 
“frequent” winner-pickers (3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=always) as well as between “light” balancers (Table 
10, row 2; 1=never, 2=rarely) and “strong” balancers (3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=always). Whereas 47% 
of firms in the overall sample engage in “strong” balancing, “frequent” winner-pickers are more likely to 
do so relative to “infrequent” winner-pickers (52% vs. 22%). This result is interesting because it sheds 
light on the deeper connection of both investments policies. Instead of viewing reallocations and cross-
subsidization as mutually exclusive, they must be interpreted as correlates. Firms that frequently transfer 
funds to more productive divisions are more likely to engage in cross-subsidization. Overall, our results 
suggest that firms operate active internal capital markets to improve investment productivity of the firm. 
However, there may be less capital reallocation than would be optimal for investors.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Second, to further investigate the causes of cross-subsidization, we examine the previously discussed 
subsample of “strong” balancers and inquire about the intentions for their investment behavior. 
Several studies have attempted to explain biases in capital allocation. Most of them view these biases as 
evidence of agency problems or rent-seeking at the level of divisional or corporate managers. Some of 
these studies argue that managers of divisions with weak investment opportunities have power over 
headquarters to achieve larger-than-efficient capital allocations because of either lower opportunity costs 
to improve their outside options (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) or their ability to act opportunistically by 
investing in inefficient projects that protect the division from subsequent expropriation (Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales, 2000). Bernardo, Luo, and Wang (2006) offer the alternative theoretical explanation that 
capital misallocation can be part of an incentive mechanism to elicit private information from divisional 
managers about investment proposals in the budgeting process. Other studies find that capital 
misallocation can result from factors related to agency considerations at the CEO level. Goel, Nanda, and 
Naranayan (2004) argue that because of career concerns, CEOs have incentives to invest in divisions in 
mature industries whose cash flows are likely more precise and thus better signals of the CEO’s abilities. 
To the extent that informativeness and divisional productivity are negatively correlated, the theory predicts 
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a capital allocation bias in favor of lower-productivity divisions. Finally, Hoang and Ruckes (2015) posit 
a more optimistic (and potentially value-enhancing) story of socialism in the sense that “informational 
effects” of capital allocation cause firms to allocate capital more evenly than pure financial criteria would 
suggest. The authors argue that capital allocation conveys headquarters’ private information about capital 
productivity to managers of a multi-divisional firm. If such information provides incentives to managers, 
headquarters has a strong interest in concealing its information with a relatively even capital allocation. 
We ask the subsample of “strong” balancers how important these motives are in their decisions to cross-
subsidize. Fig. 6 and Table 12 summarize the results.   
  
 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that for the average firm, the explanatory power of the existing theories is 
moderate to low. In unreported analyses, we find that 30% (n=16) of the firms in the subsample do not 
find any of the current theories very or highly important in explaining their investment behavior. Thirty-
two percent of firms indicate the importance of one explanation, and 26% of firms indicate the importance 
of two explanations. These results also suggest a broad heterogeneity of causes for socialism; therefore, 
multiple and different theories must be considered to understand socialism.   
The argument related to Hoang and Ruckes’ (2015) theory of corporate socialism is most frequently 
important. Of the 47% of firms that engage in cross-subsidization across divisions, more than one-third 
Fig. 6: Survey evidence on the question (n=54): “Please think about situations where you have decided to allocate 
capital more evenly than pure financial criteria suggested. How important were the following factors for your 
allocation?”   
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state that “capital allocation conveys information about the (future) role of the division as part of the firm” 
(37.0%), suggesting that financial executives acknowledge the communication aspect of capital budgets. 
Relatively even capital allocations disclose the least about the relative prospects of divisions and improve 
division managers’ incentives as they intensify competition for future allocations. All other arguments 
follow in their relative importance. We do emphasize that their ratings cluster, and ratings are not 
statistically different from each other. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales’ (2000) argument that an even capital 
allocation can prevent opportunistic investment behavior is important for 20% of executives, and this 
argument is relatively more important for firms with many business lines (30.8% vs. 10.7%). Interestingly, 
firms with high discretionary budgets at the division level are more likely to find this argument important 
(42.9% vs. 3.7%). In fact, it is the most important rationale for socialism at these firms.22 Because they 
ensure a high minimum level of funds to divisions, high divisional budgets are complementary to 
socialistic capital allocation and may protect firms against the implementation of inefficient projects that 
protect divisions from the redistribution of surplus to other divisions (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). 
A similar proportion of 20% of CFOs state that a relatively even capital allocation strengthens divisions 
in mature industries, as suggested by Goel, Nanda, and Naranayan (2004). In addition, 13% of firms use 
a more even capital allocation to “retain divisional managers” (one of several implications of Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000). Finally, at 9% of firms, Bernardo, Luo, and Wang's (2006) notion that “a more even 
capital allocation strengthens a firm's monetary performance incentive scheme” causes corporate 
socialism.  
[Insert Table 11 and 12 here]  
Finally, we examine if firms restrict access of divisions to internal capital markets under some 
circumstances. The rationing of divisional capital for investments may limit internal capital market activity 
but has been proposed as a mechanism to counter misaligned incentives (see Holmström and Ricart i 
Costa, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Specifically, we ask whether firms limit capital allocation to the 
division’s own generated cash flow. On average, 26% of executives report the use of such a rationing 
policy at the division level, indicating that firms apply this instrument selectively. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, firms are relatively more likely to impose such divisional spending limits if agency 
problems at the divisional level are perceived to be large (40.9% vs. 17.7%; Table 11, row 3).   
                                                 
22 In unreported analysis, we find that a large fraction of 58% of total capital expenditures is part of an initial divisional budget 
at these firms (compared to 32% in firms with low discretionary budgets). 
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4.2.2 The Financing Effects of Internal Capital Markets 
One important characteristic of internal capital markets is that corporate headquarters centrally raises 
external financing and pools capital that individual projects generate. This “single-lender property” of 
headquarters coupled with ownership rights over the use of project assets affects not only investments but 
also the firm’s environment for financing. In particular, the internal capital market insulates individual 
projects from costs associated with relying on external capital markets that would otherwise occur if 
divisions were standalone firms.23 The arguments underlying these “financing benefits” typically rely on 
the internal capital market’s ability to transfer funds between projects and the less-than-perfect correlation 
of divisions with respect to cash generation or cash requirements to finance capital investments. In the 
final section of our paper, we focus on these financing implications of internal capital markets. We exploit 
the multi-segment nature of our sample of diversified firms and ask how executives rate the relative 
importance of different financing benefits of integrating multiple businesses into an internal capital market 
compared to a situation in which their divisions were standalone firms.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
Our findings support recent literature that suggests how replacing the external capital market with an 
internal one may affect corporate financing. Fig. 7 and Table 13 display the results. First, more than two-
thirds (70%) of CFOs believe that the most important financial benefit of integrating multiple businesses 
under the roof of the internal capital market is “lower cost of capital” (Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas, 2013). 
They argue that the internal capital markets’ ability to transfer resources to cash-poor divisions may reduce 
a firm's systematic risk by avoiding countercyclical costs of financial distress.24 Our result provides 
confirming evidence of this argument that explicitly rejects the conventional textbook view that 
diversification cannot affect the firm’s cost of capital (see Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe, 2006). 
Coinsurance may enable the diversified firm to reduce distress risks that standalone firms cannot avoid on 
their own. Second, coinsurance can increase debt capacity, as first noted by Lewellen (1971). This 
argument is important to a large proportion of the respondents (60%).25 Therefore, our result supports 
recent empirical evidence in favor of the “more-money” hypothesis (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015), 
even though Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) find either no or weak associations 
between diversification and actual leverage. Firms with higher debt ratios (71.7% vs. 51.7%) and firms 
                                                 
23 In the long term, firms may respond to financing constraints by expanding the scope of internal capital market activity 
(Matvos, Seru, and Silva, 2017). 
24 In general, financial distress tends to occur during downturns (see, for example, Almeida and Philippon, 2007). 
25 In addition, all the CFOs in our pre-testing group emphasized the importance of this potential benefit of coinsurance. 
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with many lines of business (68.8% vs. 53.4%, see also Internet Appendix C.1, column 2) find this effect 
significantly more important. 
Third, previous research also argues that similar risk-pooling mechanisms can affect the conditions for 
raising equity (e.g., Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas, 2001).26 Forty-six percent of the surveyed CFOs 
believe that operating a division as part of a diversified firm provides better conditions for raising equity 
compared to a situation in which the divisions were standalones. Interestingly, firms with less access to 
debt place greater value on this benefit for equity issuers (very or highly important for 51.9% of firms 
with a low rating and 20.0% of firms with a high debt rating). Fourth, 40% of the CFOs find the effect 
that diversified firms have “less need to hold (precautionary) cash” very or highly important for their firm. 
This cash-holding argument is consistent with precautionary savings arguments and has recently gained 
attention in the context of corporate liquidity and diversification. Duchin (2010) finds that diversified 
firms carry significantly less cash than their standalone peers because of their ability to smooth investment 
opportunities and cash flows. Although statistically insignificant, unrelated diversified firms (44.4%) find 
this effect more important than related diversified firms (36.1%). Fifth and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
CFOs rate the relative importance of diversified firms' “ability to avoid external financing” relatively low, 
                                                 
26 The mechanism in Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) is somewhat subtler than the coinsurance argument in Lewellen 
(1971) and others. In their theoretical model, pooling risks of imperfectly correlated divisions helps reduce adverse selection 
cost when issuing equity, resulting in a less negative market reaction to an equity issue.  
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Fig. 7: Survey evidence on the question (n=106): “How important are the following effects of diversification for your 
company? Please answer compared to the situation where your divisions were standalone companies and had to raise 
funds by themselves.” 
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on average. The argument, which relates to the reliability of capital supply in internal capital markets 
(Liebeskind, 2000; Henderson 1970) and the propensity to raise external financing, is more important for 
firms that find “less need to hold (precautionary) cash” an important benefit (40.5% vs. 18.9%, 
untabulated), consistent with Duchin’s (2010) argument that internal capital markets insulate firms from 
the rationing and costs of external capital markets. Finally, tax benefits of investors, as suggested by Bhide 
(1990), do not appear to be a significant benefit of operating multiple lines of business. 
Our survey results document that financial executives have strong opinions about the financing benefits 
of internal capital markets and reject the widely-held notion that combining multiple lines of business does 
not have positive effects on a firm’s financing environment. Our findings particularly support arguments 
suggesting that internal capital markets may decrease cost of capital and improve access to external 
financing.  
5 Conclusion   
Despite an unabated interest in better understanding corporate investment, empirical research in corporate 
finance has usually stopped half-way. Although there is considerable evidence about how capital is 
allocated from investors to firms, our knowledge about how firms allocate financial resources to projects 
has not kept pace with theories of allocation processes and internal capital markets. We attempt to fill part 
of this gap by presenting an analysis of unique data from a CFO survey. Our emphasis is on the most 
relevant aspects of the internal capital allocation process and the capital markets within firms. The survey 
questions were designed to exploit the in-depth knowledge of top financial executives about this process 
(e.g., importance of agency problems inside firms, biases in proposals, choosing “socialistic” capital 
allocations, or implications for corporate financing). Our survey instrument itself is closely guided by 
economic theory and previous empirical evidence, allowing it to match theoretical predictions with 
practice.  
The results of our analysis allow us to corroborate some theories and question others. Reassuringly, our 
analysis confirms that agency issues are crucial for understanding capital allocation within firms and 
ultimately, corporate investment in the economy. Firms employ instruments to limit agency costs that are 
both organizational (e.g., layers of approval) and personal (e.g., compensation schemes) in nature, and 
their use is largely consistent with theoretical models of capital budgeting. Our findings confirm that firms 
actively reallocate financial resources across divisions via internal capital markets to take advantage of 
more profitable investment opportunities. The tendency to distribute capital relatively evenly exists even 
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though CFOs by and large reject explanations offered by existing work, leaving open questions regarding 
the causes and value effects of such “socialistic” allocations. Despite the success of existing theories of 
capital allocation, the findings call for a renewed investigation of the central elements of internal capital 
markets. The strong emphasis given to bottom-up components in the allocation process—while 
undoubtedly important—may be overstated. Top management’s role is only partly to evaluate project 
proposals. Our results show that using private knowledge and expertise, top management actively shapes 
the firm’s investment policy, often beyond financial projections and other hard information provided by 
division management—especially if agency problems are severe. This suggests that its private information 
may lead top management to extend its involvement even further than identified in our study. Investigating 
these issues may be a fruitful area for future research. Finally, we hope that our findings will motivate 
future theories and help guide the design of large-sample archival work on corporate investment. 
Practitioners also may find our study valuable because the findings allow executives to convert conjectures 
and anecdotal evidence into stylized or even hard facts.   
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Table A
Summary statistics based on the survey responses
Percent Count Percent Count
10-25 3,5% 4 < 1 1,7% 2
25-100 7,8% 9 1-10 18,3% 21
100-500 16,5% 19 10-50 26,1% 30
500-1,000 13,9% 16 50-100 14,8% 17
1,000-5,000 29,6% 34 100-500 14,8% 17
5,000-10,000 7,0% 8 500-1,000 10,4% 12
> 10,000 21,7% 25 >1,000 13,9% 16
100,0% 115 100,0% 115
2 26,1% 30 ≤ 15 21,7% 25
3 28,7% 33 > 15 to 30 34,8% 40
4 23,5% 27 > 30 to 50 24,3% 28
> 4 21,7% 25 > 50 19,1% 22
100,0% 115 100,0% 115
Manufacturing 25,9% 51 Germany 35,7% 41
Construction 11,2% 22 United Kingdom 10,4% 12
Retail and Wholesale 9,1% 18 Switzerland 10,4% 12
Tech (Software, Biotech) 9,1% 18 France 8,7% 10
Energy 7,6% 15 Austria 8,7% 10
Transport 6,6% 13 Sweden 8,7% 10
Consulting, Service 6,6% 13 Netherlands 5,2% 6
Pharma, Healthcare 5,6% 11 Norway 4,3% 5
Communication, Media 3,6% 7 Belgium 3,5% 4
Mining 1,0% 2 Denmark 2,6% 3
Bank, Finance, Insurance 1,0% 2 Finland 1,7% 2
Other 12,7% 25 100,0% 115
AAA, AA 7,8% 9 ≤ 2 25,2% 29
A 11,3% 13 3 to 4 25,2% 29
BBB 18,3% 21 5 to 6 15,7% 18
BB, B 8,7% 10 7 to 8 11,3% 13
No Rating 53,9% 62 ≥ 9 22,6% 26
100,0% 115 100,0% 115
 
public 82,6% 95 < 40 8,7% 10
private 17,4% 20 40 to 50 46,1% 53
100,0% 115 51 to 59 34,8% 40
> 59 10,4% 12
100,0% 115
0 to 1 67,8% 78
> 1 32,2% 37
100,0% 115 male 98,3% 113
female 1,7% 2
100,0% 115
Yes 74,8% 86
No 25,2% 29 College degree 4,3% 5
100,0% 115 Non-MBA Master's 28,7% 33
MBA 49,6% 57
Dr. / PhD 17,4% 20
100,0% 115
Single investor owns more than 
10% of companys equity
Table A reports summary statistics of responding firms and their CFOs. The data is drawn from 115 completed questionnaires. Variables and 
their categories are defined in Table D. Because firms can operate in several industries, observations for Industry sum up to more than 115.  
Annual sales revenue (€ millions) CAPEX (€ millions)
No. lines of business
Industry
CFO education
Country
Gender of CFO
Credit rating
Ownership
Debt-to-asset ratio (%)
CFO tenure (years)
CFO age (years)
Managerial ownership (%)
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Table B
Definitions and data sources for variables used in cross-sectional analysis
Control variable Subsample 1 Definition 1 Subsample 2 Definition 2 Source
Size small ≤ EUR 1bn revenue large > EUR 1bn revenue Annual sales revenue at my company is in the range of? (Question 1, Closing Section)
Lines of business few ≤ 3 many > 3 How many lines of business is your company running? (Question 2, Closing Section)
Diversification related 1 primary industry unrelated ≥ 2 primary industries What broad industries are you working in? (Question 3, Closing Section)
Capital constraints no unconstrained yes constrained When capital markets are operating normally, is your company capital constrained? (Question 1, Section D)
Debt ratio low ≤ 30% high > 30% What is your debt-to-asset ratio (e.g., 0.2, 0.3)? (Question 7, Closing Section)
Agency Cost low ≤ 0.4 high > 0.4 Average value of the five ratings of within-firm agency problems (4 or 5 recoded as 1, and 1, 2, or 3 recoded as 0) (Question 5a-c, e-f, Section B)
Equity public public firms private private firms Ownership? (Question 5a, Closing Section)
Managerial ownership low ≤ 1% high > 1% If all options were exercised, what percentage of your company’s equity would be owned by the top 3 managers (e.g., 5%)? (Question 5b, Closing Section)
Rating low A- or better high BBB+ or worse What is your credit issuer rating (e.g., AA-, B+)? Write NONE if debt is not rated. (Question 6, Closing Section)
Age (year) young ≤ 50 years mature > 50 years Age of CFO? (Question 2, CFO Demographics)
Tenure (year) short ≤ 4 years long > 4 years Tenure (time in current job) of CFO (Question 3, CFO Demographics)
Education MBA, PhD. MBA, PhD. others Undergraduate, Non-MBA Master's Highest educational background?  (Question 4, CFO Demographics)
This table defines the variables used in the cross-sectional analyses. We divide the total sample into two groups using the medians as cut-off points for all variables except for Diversification (one/many major industries), Capital 
constraints (yes/no), Equity (public/private), and Education (MBA and PhD/other). The industry definition follows Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). The last column shows from which survey sections the variables are 
drawn. 
41
Table C
Correlations of control variables of the survey
                                                       
Lines of business (few to many)              0.202**  
Diversification (related to unrelated)                 - 0,005 0.155*               
Capital constrained (no to yes)             - 0.322*** 0.007               - 0,046
Debt ratio (low to high)                       - 0.182** 0,014 - 0,026 0,144
Equity (public to private)                           0.109   0.136               0,060 0.095               0,125
Managerial ownership (low to high)           - 0.196*  0.034               0.162           0.152               0,035 - 0.051 
Rating (high to low)                         0.054   - 0.003              0.336**          - 0.103              0,074 - 0.041 - 0.118                 
Age (young to mature)                           0.131   - 0.018              0,049 0.007               0,127 0.090  - 0.014                 - 0.197   
Tenure (short to long)                         0.063   0.008               0,113 0.025               0,043 0.004  0.175                  - 0.029   0.392***
Educ. MBA Dr. (MBA, Dr. to others)            - 0.118  0.105               - 0,057 0.017               0,092 0.019  0.165                  - 0.089   - 0.081 - 0.031   
***, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.
Size    
(small 
to large)
 Capital 
constrained  Diversification  Lines of business 
(few 
to many)
Table C reports the correlations (ϕ/mean square contingency) for Size, Lines of business, Diversification, Diversity in investment prospects, Debt ratio, Equity, Managerial ownership, Rating, Age, Tenure, Education (firm and CFO) 
characteristics. Variables and their categories are defined in Table D.
(short 
to long)(public to private) (young to mature)
(low to 
high)
(high to 
low)
 Age 
(related to 
unrelated)
 Rating 
(no to 
yes)
 Managerial 
ownership  Tenure  Equity  Debt ratio 
(low to 
high)
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Table D
Responding and non-responding firms: Firm characteristics
Country
n p n p
Germany 212 21,4% 41 35,7% 0,00 ***
Austria 30 3,0% 10 8,7% 0,00 ***
Switzerland 66 6,7% 12 10,4% 0,10
United Kingdom 243 24,5% 12 10,4% 0,00 ***
Sweden 79 8,0% 10 8,7% 0,77
Netherlands 37 3,7% 6 5,2% 0,40
Belgium 29 2,9% 4 3,5% 0,72
Norway 44 4,4% 5 4,3% 0,96
France 175 17,6% 10 8,7% 0,01 **
Denmark 33 3,3% 3 2,6% 0,67
Finland 44 4,4% 2 1,7% 0,16
Total 992 100,0% 115 100,0% 0,00 ***
2 segments 200 20,2% 30 26,1% 0,11
3-4 segments 529 53,3% 60 52,2% 0,80
≥ 5 segments 263 26,5% 25 21,7% 0,25
Total 992 100,0% 115 100,0% 0,22
Annual revenue
< 25 million € 72 7,3% 4 3,5% 0,10
25-100 million € 174 17,5% 9 7,8% 0,00 ***
100-500 million € 284 28,6% 19 16,5% 0,01 **
0.5-1 billion € 115 11,6% 16 13,9% 0,07 *
1-5 billion € 200 20,2% 34 29,6% 0,11
5-10 billion € 53 5,3% 8 7,0% 0,23
> 10 billion € 94 9,5% 25 21,7% 0,00 ***
Total 992 100,0% 115 100,0% 0,00 ***
Debt ratio
Low (≤ 0.3) 466 52,1% 65 56,5% 0,34
High (> 0.3) 429 47,9% 50 43,5% 0,34
missing 97 0
Total 992 100,0% 115 100,0% 0,34
***, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.
This table reports statistics of the 115 "surveyed" firms and the 992 "invited" firms that we selected from Worldscope. The analysis is based on the variables Country, 
Number of operating segments, Annual revenue, Equity, Capex-to-asset ratio, and Debt ratio. Demographic characteristics of the "invited" firms are obtained from 
Worldscope. Demographic characteristics for the "surveyed firms" are obtained from the questionnaire. Variables and their categories are defined in Table D.
Chi-square tests for goodness of fit across all categories of the six variables are conducted to test whether the distribution of each variable in the sample of "surveyed" 
firms follows the patterns in the population of "invited" firms. The six values in the last column and row of each table (in bold) report the p-values. In addition, one-
proportion z-tests (here: also equivalent to chi-square tests) are conducted to compare the proportion of "surveyed" firms in a particular category to the proportion of 
"invited" firms. 
Significance 
levelCharacteristics Invitations Invitations (%) Received Received (%) p-value
Number of operating Segments
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Table 1
Asymmetric Information and Agency Problems Inside the Firm
Questions Obs. Mean
- 106 3,72
(1) 106 3,58
(2) 106 3,52
(3) 106 3,48
(4) 106 3,11
(5) 106 2,27
% agree or strongly 
agree
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
- 70,8 65,1 74,6 69,0 72,9 63,9 80.0** 74,3 62,5 68,3 73,9 74,5 67,8
(1) 62,3 58,1 65,1 67,2 56,3 70,5 51.1** 58,1 71,9 61,7 63,0 57,4 66,1
(2) 55,7 58,1 54,0 60,3 50,0 47,5 66.7** 51,4 65,6 55,0 56,5 40,4 67.8***
(3) 55,7 55,8 55,6 48,3 64.6* 54,1 57,8 51,4 65,6 48,3 65.2* 0,0 100,0
(4) 42,5 44,2 41,3 48,3 35,4 39,3 46,7 33,8 62.5*** 41,7 43,5 38,3 45,8
(5) 11,3 11,6 11,1 12,1 10,4 11,5 11,1 12,2 9,4 8,3 15,2 12,8 10,1
% agree or strongly 
agree
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
- 70,8 69,3 77,8 72,2 67,6 75,0 85,2 69,5 72,3 74,5 66,7 71,8 68,6
(1) 62,3 59,1 77,8 62,5 61,8 60,0 77,8 57,6 68,1 61,8 62,7 57,7 71,4
(2) 55,7 53,4 66,7 54,2 58,8 60,0 74,1 54,2 57,4 63,6 47.1* 53,5 60,0
(3) 55,7 55,7 55,6 54,2 58,8 65,0 70,4 55,9 55,3 56,4 54,9 47,9 71.4**
(4) 42,5 44,3 33,3 37,5 52,9 45,0 37,0 42,4 42,6 52,7 31.4** 39,4 48,6
(5) 11,3 12,5 5,6 12,5 8,8 10,0 7,4 11,9 10,6 16,4 5.9* 14,1 5,7
Survey responses to the question: If another corporate manager made the following statements, how strongly would you agree or disagree with each of them when you think about the divisional management in your company? 
If divisional management were running their divisions as stand-alone companies, they would act more 
entrepreneurial.
If divisional management were running their divisions as stand-alone companies, they would work harder.
42,5
11,3
30,2
63,2
1, 5
1-4
Divisional managers have superior information / knowledge about their businesses compared to the information 
that headquarters has.
If divisional management were running their divisions as stand-alone companies, they would feel more 
committed to raising the firm's attractiveness to capital markets.
22,6
14,2
5
5
Divisional managers prefer running large divisions with more capital under their control over running small 
divisions with less capital under their control.
Divisional managers try to influence the capital allocation decisions of headquarters.
-
4-5
11,3
15,1
Panel A
% disagree or strongly 
disagree
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
Age Tenure Education
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Size Lines of business Diversification
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that agree (4) or strongly agree (5) with a statement, and the percentage of respondents that disagree (2) 
or strongly disagree (1) with a statement. The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of each pair of sub-questions are statistically 
different. For instance, the rating in row 1  ("If divisional management were running their divisions as stand-alone companies, they would feel more committed to raising the firm's attractiveness to capital markets."; % very or highly 
important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 4-5.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (agree) and 5 (strongly agree) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies Fisher's exact tests). 
See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
% agree or
strongly agree
70,8
62,3
55,7
55,7
Capital constrained Debt ratio Empire Building
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Panel B
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Table 2
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Survey responses
Obs. % Yes % No
(1) 112 97,3 2,7
(2) 109 97,2 2,8
% Yes
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 97,3 95,7 98,5 96,7 98,0 96,8 98,0 96,2 100,0 95,3 100,0 95,1 100,0
(2) 97,2 95,5 98,5 96,6 98,0 98,4 95,8 97,3 97,1 98,4 97,9 98,2 97,7
% Yes
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 97,3 97,8 94,7 96,1 100,0 100,0 100,0 96,7 98,0 96,4 98,2 96,0 100,0
(2) 97,2 100,0 83.3*** 98,6 94,4 95,2 100,0 94,9 100,0 98,1 96,4 100,0 91.9**
Ratings are based on a two-point (yes/no) scale.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the percentage of respondents that answer yes and no.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered yes across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies 
Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 
% level, respectively. 
Agency Cost
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating Age Tenure Education
Size
Panel A
Questions
Does headquarters have the decision-making authority regarding major investments?
Is approval from headquarters required beyond a certain size of investment?
Lines of business Capital constrained Debt ratioDiversification
Panel B
45
Table 3
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Survey responses
Obs. Mean Median Min/max
(1) 80 5,15 0,5 0.001/65
(2) 105 78,8 20,0 2/4500
(2a) 104 36,3 20,0 2/300
Median
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 0,50 0,1 2*** 0,4 1,0 0,6 0,5 1,0 0.15* 1,0 0.2** 0,6 0,5
(2) 20,0 17,5 25** 18,8 25,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 32.5** 17,5 25** 20,0 25,0
(2a) 20,0 17,5 25** 17,5 25,0 20,0 20,0 18,8 32.5** 17,5 25** 20,0 25,0
Median
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others no yes
(1) 0,50 0,5 3,8 1,0 0.1*** 5,0 1,2 0,5 0,6 1,0 0,5 1,0 0,5 0,20 0,60
(2) 20,0 20,0 20,0 22,5 17,5 25,0 18,8 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 10,0 25.0***
(2a) 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 17,5 22,5 18,8 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 10,0 25.0***
Panel A
Questions
If approval from headquarters is required beyond a certain size of investment, from which project size (threshold amount) on does the authority to make 
decisions reside with headquarters? (Mio €)
In an average year, how many investment proposals are submitted to headquarters for approval? (n)
In an average year, how many investment proposals are submitted to headquarters for approval? (outlier-adjusted) (n)
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating Age Tenure Education Winner-Picking
Respondents were asked to enter a threshold amount and the number of investment proposals in an average year.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the median, the minimum and the maximum.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the medians across subsamples using Kruskal Wallis and Mood tests of differences in medians. See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. 
***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Survey responses  
Obs. Mean Median Min/max
(1) 105 38,8 40,0 0/95
(2) 105 77,7 80,0 17/100
(3) 92 68,6 72,5 0/100
Mean
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 38,8 28,9 45.7*** 38,8 38,9 40,6 36,5 42,0 32.1* 44,5 31.3** 44,2 31.6**
(2) 77,7 76,3 78,8 77,0 78,7 76,9 78,8 79,1 75,0 78,6 76,6 79,9 73.9*
(3) 68,6 74,5 65,0 69,6 67,5 64,8 73,6 70,0 65,6 70,0 67,0 68,6 66,9
Mean
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 38,8 38,2 41,9 42,0 33,0 43,8 40,1 37,7 40,0 38,2 39,3 41,0 34,3
(2) 77,7 76,8 82,1 79,0 76,0 76,8 73,4 77,7 77,8 76,8 78,6 76,2 80,9
(3) 68,6 68,6 68,7 66,0 74,0 65,1 66,3 70,2 66,8 71,1 66,0 66,3 73,5
On average, how many proposals receive close scrutiny by headquarters? (%)
Panel A
Questions
What percentage of the total amount of capital expenditures of your company in an average year does not require explicit approval by the headquarters (e.g., 
because it is part of an initial divisional budget)? (%)
Panel B2
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
On average, how many of these (= investment proposals, see Table 3) obtain approval? (%)
Panel B2 (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating Age Tenure Education
Respondents were asked to enter percentages.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the median, the minimum and the maximum.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the mean score across subsamples using standard differences of means tests. See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote 
statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 5
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Survey responses
Obs. % Yes % No
(1) 109 98,2 1,8
% Yes
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 98,2 97,7 98,5 100,0 96,0 98,4 97,9 97,3 100,0 98,4 97,9 100,0 95.3*
% Yes
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 98,2 97,8 100,0 97,3 100,0 95,2 96,7 98,3 98,0 96,3 100,0 98,6 97,3
Ratings are based on a two-point (yes/no) scale.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the percentage of respondents that answer yes and no.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered yes across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies 
Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 
% level, respectively. 
Equity Managerial ownership
Panel B (continued)
Rating Age Tenure Education
Panel A
Question
Does divisional management provide financial information such as cash flow forecasts or NPV calculations as part of their investment proposals?
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
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Table 6
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Survey responses
Obs. Mean
(1) 108 2,5
% higher than 
actual outcomes
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 50,9 59,1 45,3 55,9 44,9 50,8 51,1 48,6 55,9 56,7 43,8 50,0 52,4
% higher than 
actual outcomes
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 50,9 52,2 44,4 51,4 50,0 52,4 48,3 48,3 54,0 60,4 41.8* 48,6 55,6
Panel A
Question % higher than actual outcomes
% lower than 
actual outcomes
On average, the forecasts provided in investment proposals are... 50,9 12,0
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (substantially higher than actual outcomes) to 5 (substantially lower than actual outcomes). 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that answered 1 (substantially higher than actual 
outcomes) and 2 (higher than actual outcomes), and the percentage of respondents that answered 4 (lower than actual outcomes) and 5 (substantially lower than actual outcomes).
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 1 (substantially higher than actual outcomes) and 2 (higher than actual outcomes) 
across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical 
significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
Age Tenure Education
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Table 7
The Organization of Internal Capital Allocation: Headquarters and Investment Decisions 
Question Obs. Mean
(1) 109 3,70
(2) 109 3,83
(3) 109 3,27
(4) 109 3,11
(5) 109 2,72
(6) 109 2,67
(7) 109 2,51
(8) 109 2,33
(9) 109 2,03
% very or highly 
important
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 72,5 70,5 73,8 78,0 66,0 70,5 75,0 73,3 70,6 70,5 75,0 62,1 83.7**
(2) 68,8 70,5 67,7 64,4 74,0 72,1 64,6 72,0 61,8 67,2 70,8 63,8 76,7
(3) 53,2 36,4 64.6*** 49,2 58,0 55,7 50,0 61,3 35.3** 54,1 52,1 62,1 44.1*
(4) 44,0 36,4 49,2 28,8 62.0*** 41,0 47,9 48,0 35,3 41,0 47,9 41,4 46,5
(5) 33,0 25,0 38,5 35,6 30,0 36,1 29,2 38,7 20.6* 36,1 29,2 27,6 37,2
(6) 23,9 25,0 23,1 20,3 28,0 24,6 22,9 25,3 20,6 23,0 25,0 22,4 25,6
(7) 22,0 25,0 20,0 18,6 26,0 21,3 22,9 26,7 11.8* 24,6 18,8 24,1 18,6
(8) 17,4 20,5 15,4 15,3 20,0 16,4 18,8 20,0 11,8 18,0 16,7 13,8 23,3
(9) 12,8 13,6 12,3 10,2 16,0 16,4 8,3 12,0 14,7 11,5 14,6 12,1 16,3
% very or highly 
important
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 72,5 74,7 61,1 71,2 75,0 71,4 70,0 71,2 74,0 83,3 61.8** 72,2 73,0
(2) 68,8 69,2 66,7 64,4 77,8 71,4 50,0 67,8 70,0 77,8 60.0** 70,8 64,9
(3) 53,2 52,7 55,6 56,2 47,2 38,1 63.3* 52,5 54,0 51,9 54,5 55,6 48,6
(4) 44,0 44,0 44,4 47,9 36,1 52,4 43,3 42,4 46,0 46,3 41,8 45,8 40,5
(5) 33,0 31,9 38,9 32,9 33,3 38,1 30,0 37,3 28,0 37,0 29,1 29,2 40,5
(6) 23,9 25,3 16,7 19,2 33,3 23,8 20,0 20,3 28,0 22,2 25,5 29,2 13.5*
(7) 22,0 22,0 22,2 20,5 25,0 14,3 20,0 16,9 28,0 16,7 27,3 22,2 21,6
(8) 17,4 17,6 16,7 15,1 22,2 19,0 6,7 16,9 18,0 16,7 18,2 20,8 10,8
(9) 12,8 13,2 11,1 13,7 11,1 9,5 16,7 15,3 10,0 18,5 7.3* 12,5 13,5
12,8
53,2
1-4
1-5
We adopt criteria (e.g., payback rules) that discount distant long-horizon cash flows more heavily than does the NPV method.
The proportion of performance-based pay relative to base salary is high if a divisional manager claims better expected 
investment prospects.
45,0
17,4
We link the performance-based pay of divisional managers to overall firm performance. 
We require divisional managers to produce investment proposals with information that can be verified by headquarters.
45,9
37,6
1-3, 8-9
1-4, 9
We grant each division a minimum level of capital budget / investment.
We put a relatively high weight on industry information that is gathered externally compared to internal information.
33,0
23,9
16,5
7,3
Panel B
Size Lines of business
21,1
32,1
1-2, 5-9
1-2, 6-9
We set the required hurdle rate for project approval in excess of the "true" cost of capital.
We have institutionalized post-investment audits.
67,0 1-6We rotate divisional managers across divisions.
22,0
Survey responses to the question: How important are the following business practices in your company to ensure that divisional managers provide truthful forecasts and do not overstate the attractiveness of investment projects? If you use these practices for other reasons and n    
reporting, please check “Not Important”.
Panel A
% somewhat or not
important
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
Age Tenure Education
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that find a business practice very (4) or highly important (5), and the percentage of respondents that find a business practice somewhat 
(2) or not important (1). The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of each pair of sub-questions are statistically different. For instance, the rating in row 1 ("We link 
the performance-based pay of divisional managers to overall firm performance."; % very or highly important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 3-9.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (very important) and 5 (highly important) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for 
column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
% very or highly
important
72,5
68,8
53,2
44,0
Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important). 
3-9
3-9
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Table 8
Headquarters and Allocation of Capital
Survey responses to the question: How important are the following financial criteria for your capital allocation decision? 
Question Obs. Mean
(1) Internal rate of return (IRR) 115 3,84
(2) Net present value (NPV) 115 3,82
(3) Payback period 115 3,77
(4) Sensitivity analysis 115 3,60
(5) Hurdle rate 115 2,93
(6) Real-option valuation methods 115 1,77
% very or highly 
important
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 70,4 70,8 70,1 73,0 67,3 78,5 60.0** 71,3 68,6 69,2 72,0 69,4 75,0
(2) 69,6 60,4 76.1* 66,7 73,1 72,3 66,0 70,0 68,6 72,3 66,0 66,1 75,0
(3) 64,3 72,9 58,2 66,7 61,5 52,3 80.0*** 65,0 62,9 67,7 60,0 61,3 63,6
(4) 64,3 54,2 71.6* 58,7 71,2 69,2 58,0 66,3 60,0 67,7 60,0 64,5 68,2
(5) 37,4 22,9 47.8*** 30,2 46.2* 40,0 34,0 45,0 20.0** 38,5 36,0 40,3 29,5
(6) 6,1 4,2 7,5 4,8 7,7 6,2 6,0 6,2 5,7 6,2 6,0 4,8 9,1
% very or highly 
important
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others low high
(1) 70,4 68,4 80,0 71,8 67,6 63,6 67,7 74,6 65,4 74,1 66,7 71,4 68,4 80,1 68,0
(2) 69,6 70,5 65,0 73,1 62,2 68,2 67,7 73,0 65,4 79,3 59.6** 70,1 68,4 80,6 65,3
(3) 64,3 64,2 65,0 62,8 67,6 31,8 74.2*** 69,8 57,7 65,5 63,2 62,3 68,4 48,4 68.0*
(4) 64,3 65,3 60,0 65,4 66,2 72,7 61,3 61,9 67,3 74,1 54.4** 62,3 68,4 67,7 65,3
(5) 37,4 38,9 30,0 37,2 37,8 59,1 41,9 30.2* 46,2 31,0 43,9 39,0 34,2 29,0 38,7
(6) 6,1 6,3 5,0 7,7 2,7 9,1 9,7 4,8 7,7 5,2 7,0 5,2 7,9 3,2 8,0
Panel A
% somewhat or not 
important
19,1
13,9
11,3
14,8
77,4
Age Tenure Education
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Size Lines of business Diversification
1-4, 6
1-5
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that find a budgeting method very (4) or highly important (5), and the percentage of 
respondents that find a budgeting method somewhat (2) or not important (1). The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of 
each pair of sub-questions are statistically different. For instance, the rating in row 1 ("Internal rate of return (IRR)"; % very or highly important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 5-6.
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important). 
Panel B
Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
Information Asymmetries
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (very important) and 5 (highly important) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected 
frequencies Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
% very or highly
important
70,4
69,6
64,3
64,3
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
5-6
5-6
5-6
5-6
36,537,4
6,1
51
Table 9
Headquarters and Allocation of Capital
Survey responses to the question: How important are the following factors that go beyond pure financial criteria for your capital allocation decision?
Question Obs. Mean
(1) Strategic information of top management 115 4,0
(2) The assessment of divisional managers' abilities to deliver the expected results 115 4,0
(3) Ability to execute projects (e.g., manpower, knowledge) 115 4,1
(4) Current market trends 115 3,5
(5) Previous industry experience or affiliation of decision-makers at headquarters 115 3,3
% very or highly 
important
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 82,6 75,0 88.1* 82,5 82,7 84,6 80,0 85,0 77,1 84,6 80,0 75,8 88.6*
(2) 79,1 83,3 76,1 85,7 71.2* 72,3 88.0** 82,5 71,4 80,0 78,0 74,1 86.4*
(3) 79,1 83,3 76,1 79,4 78,8 81,5 76,0 83,7 68.6* 81,5 76,0 79,0 77,3
(4) 52,2 47,9 55,2 54,0 50,0 61,5 40.0** 53,7 48,6 49,2 56,0 53,2 50,0
(5) 42,6 45,8 40,3 42,9 42,3 47,7 36,0 45,0 37,1 44,6 40,0 32,3 56.8**
% very or highly 
important
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 82,6 83,2 80,0 84,6 78,4 86,4 87,1 79,4 86,5 84,5 80,7 81,8 84,2
(2) 79,1 80,0 75,0 78,2 81,1 54,5 90.3*** 77,8 80,8 81,0 77,2 81,8 73,7
(3) 79,1 82,1 65.0* 76,9 83,8 77,3 83,9 76,2 82,7 77,6 80,7 81,8 73,7
(4) 52,2 54,7 40,0 52,6 51,4 45,5 48,4 58,7 44,2 53,4 50,9 57,1 42,1
(5) 42,6 43,2 40,0 41,0 45,9 36,4 45,2 42,9 42,3 48,3 36,8 42,9 42,1
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important). 
Panel A
% somewhat or not 
important
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio
Equity Managerial ownership Rating Age Tenure Education
1-342,6
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
4-5
4-5
4-5
1-3
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that find a factor very (4) or highly important (5), and the percentage of respondents that find a 
factor somewhat (2) or not important (1).  The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of each pair of sub-questions are 
statistically different. For instance, the rating in row 1 ("Strategic information of top management"; % very or highly important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 4-5.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (very important) and 5 (highly important) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies 
Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
% very or highly
important
82,6
79,1
79,1
52,2
19,1
5,2
18,3
5,2
6,1
Agency Cost
Panel B (continued)
52
Table 10
Headquarters and Allocation of Capital
Survey responses
Question Obs. Mean % often or always
% some- 
times % rarely % never
(1) 115 3,55 52,2 32,2 13,9 1,7
(2) 115 2,37 12,2 34,8 29,6 23,5
% Sometimes to 
always
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 84,3 77,1 89.6* 82,5 86,5 81,5 88,0 81,3 91,4 86,2 82,0 90,3 79,5
(2) 47,0 47,9 46,3 44,4 50,0 46,2 48,0 47,5 45,7 40,0 56.0* 45,1 47,7
% Sometimes to 
always
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others no yes
(1) 84,3 81,1 100** 84,6 83,8 81,8 87,1 82,5 86,5 84,5 84,2 83,1 86,8 0,0 100,0
(2) 47,0 44,2 60,0 47,4 45,9 54,5 51,6 47,6 46,2 48,3 45,6 46,8 47,4 22,2 51.5**
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that engage in winner-picking (Section D, Q4) / corporate 
socialism (Section D, Q7) often (4) or always (5), sometimes (3), rarely (2), or never (1).
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (often) and 5 (always) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small 
expected frequencies Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at 
the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
Winner-PickingTenure EducationAge
Diversified firms may use the ability to move funds from divisions that are generating strong cash flow 
to divisions with less cash flow but strong investment opportunities. How frequently do you use this 
ability in order to achieve the highest capital productivity?
How frequently do you allocate financial resources more evenly across divisions than pure financial 
criteria (e.g., NPV) suggest?
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Capital constrained
Panel A
Panel B
Debt ratio Agency CostSize Lines of business Diversification
53
Table 11
Capital Investment in Internal Capital Markets: Headquarters and Allocation of Capital
Survey responses
Obs. % Yes % No
(1) 115 30,4 69,6
(2) 115 55,7 44,3
(3) 115 26,1 73,9
% Yes
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 30,4 47,9 17.9*** 30,2 30,8 32,3 28,0 0,0 100,0 24,6 38,0 30,0 43.1**
(2) 55,7 50,0 59,7 58,7 51,9 58,5 52,0 50,0 68.6* 49,2 64,0 56,5 54,5
(3) 26,1 25,0 26,9 19,0 34.6* 24,6 28,0 20,0 40.0** 24,6 28,0 17,7 40.9***
% Yes
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 30,4 28,4 40,0 25,6 40,5 31,8 22,6 30,2 30,8 29,3 31,6 29,9 31,6
(2) 55,7 57,9 45,0 50,0 67.6* 59,1 51,6 57,1 53,8 56,9 54,4 53,2 60,5
(3) 26,1 28,4 15,0 23,1 32,4 9,1 38.7** 30,2 21,2 24,1 28,1 27,3 23,7
Ratings are based on a twp-point (yes/no) scale.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the percentage of respondents that answer yes and no.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered yes across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies 
Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 
% level, respectively. 
Debt ratio
Panel B
Panel A
Question
When capital markets are operating normally, is your company capital constrained? In other words: Does your financing capacity limit your ability to 
pursue attractive investment projects.
Does your company's top management impose a limit on total investments of the firm by a predetermined, fixed budget?
Is the capital allocation to a division restricted by the division's own generated cash flow?
Age Tenure Education
Agency Cost
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained
54
Table 12
Headquarters and Allocation of Capital
Question Obs. Mean
(1) 54 2,80
(2) 54 2,50
(3) 54 2,74
(4) 54 2,50
(6) A more even capital allocation helps to retain divisional managers. 54 2,26
(5) Too uneven capital allocation diminishes divisional managers' motivation. 54 2,15
(7) 54 2,20
% very or highly 
important
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 37,0 34,8 38,7 28,6 46,2 40,0 33,3 28,9 56.3* 42,3 32,1 32,1 42,9
(2) 20,4 13,0 25,8 10,7 30.8* 20,0 20,8 23,7 12,5 23,1 17,9 25,0 14,3
(3) 20,4 21,7 19,4 14,3 26,9 20,0 20,8 23,7 12,5 23,1 17,9 17,9 23,8
(4) 16,7 13,0 19,4 17,9 15,4 10,0 25,0 15,8 18,8 15,4 17,9 10,7 19,0
(6) 13,0 13,0 12,9 10,7 15,4 16,7 8,3 7,9 25.0* 11,5 14,3 7,1 23,8
(5) 13,0 13,0 12,9 10,7 15,4 13,3 12,5 10,5 18,8 7,7 17,9 7,1 19,0
(7) 9,3 13,0 6,5 7,1 11,5 3,3 16.67* 5,3 18,8 15,4 3.6** 7,1 4,8
% very or highly 
important
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others low high
(1) 37,0 35,7 41,7 35,1 41,2 50,0 25,0 30,0 45,8 35,7 38,5 41,7 27,8 37,0 33,3
(2) 20,4 19,0 25,0 21,6 17,6 16,7 25,0 20,0 20,8 21,4 19,2 25,0 11,1 3,7 42.9***
(3) 20,4 16,7 33,3 18,9 23,5 8,3 25,0 20,0 20,8 17,9 23,1 16,7 27,8 14,8 19,1
(4) 16,7 14,3 25,0 13,5 23,5 16,7 25,0 20,0 12,5 25,0 7.7* 22,2 5,6 22,2 14,3
(6) 13,0 11,9 16,7 10,8 17,6 25,0 12,5 13,3 12,5 17,9 7,7 11,1 16,7 18,5 9,5
(5) 13,0 16,7 0,0 5,4 29.4** 16,7 18,8 16,7 8,3 7,1 19,2 5,6 27.8** 14,8 9,5
(7) 9,3 4,8 25.0** 5,4 17,6 8,3 18,8 6,7 12,5 3,6 15,4 8,3 11,1 7,4 9,5
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important). 
Survey responses to the question: Please think about situations where you have decided to allocate capital more evenly than pure financial criteria suggested. 
How important were the following factors for your allocation?
Panel A - answers filtered by "sometimes to always" of Question "How frequently do you allocate financial resources more evenly across divisions than pure financial criteria (e.g., NPV) suggest?" (see Table 12)
% somewhat or not 
important
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost 
Age Tenure Education
Panel B (continued) 
Equity Managerial ownership Rating Discretionary Budgets 
A more even capital allocation frequently strengthens divisions in mature industries.
A more even capital allocation stimulates divisional managers’ motivation to generate new investment ideas.
35,2
51,9
Capital allocation conveys information about the (future) role of the division as part of the firm.
A more even capital allocation avoids opportunistic investment behavior within divisions.
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
3-7
-
1
1
1
1
1
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from the firms that indicate that they frequently engage in socialism (Section D, Q4; 3=sometimes, 4= rarely, 5=always) following the definition in Section 4.2.1. We report the mean 
score, the percentage of respondents that find a factor very (4) or highly important (5), and the percentage of respondents that find a factor somewhat (2) or not important (1). The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the 
analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of each pair of sub-questions are statistically different. For instance, the rating in row 1 ("Capital allocation conveys information about the 
(future) role of the division as part of the firm."; % very or highly important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 3-7.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (very important) and 5 (highly important) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected frequencies 
Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
A more even capital allocation strengthens our monetary performance incentive scheme.
% very or highly
important
37,0
20,4
20,4
16,7
13,0
13,0
9,3 59,3
59,3
57,4
37,0
46,3
55
Table 13
Financing Effects of Diversification
Section B, Question 3 Obs. Mean
(1) Lower cost of capital 106 3,81
(2) Ability to borrow more / Higher debt capacity 106 3,51
(3) Better conditions for raising equity 106 3,26
(4) Less need to hold (precautionary) cash 106 3,16
(5) Ability to avoid external financing 106 2,87
(6) Lower personal taxes for investors 106 1,82
% very or highly 
important
small large few many related unrelated no yes low high low high
(1) 69,8 65,1 73,0 69,0 70,8 72,1 66,7 73,0 62,5 66,7 73,9 72,6 65,9
(2) 60,4 62,8 58,7 53,4 68,8 57,4 64,4 62,2 56,3 51,7 71.7** 58,1 63,6
(3) 46,2 46,5 46,0 41,4 52,1 47,5 44,4 48,6 40,6 41,7 52,2 46,8 45,5
(4) 39,6 44,2 36,5 39,7 39,6 36,1 44,4 40,5 37,5 38,3 41,3 38,7 40,9
(5) 27,4 16,3 34.9** 19,0 37.5** 21,3 35,6 33,8 12.5** 33,3 19,6 30,6 22,7
(6) 4,7 4,7 4,8 3,4 6,2 6,6 2,2 5,4 3,1 5,0 4,3 6,5 2,3
% very or highly 
important
public private low high high low young mature short long MBA, Dr. others
(1) 69,8 71,6 61,1 68,1 73,5 70,0 66,7 71,2 68,1 74,5 64,7 69,0 71,4
(2) 60,4 63,6 44,4 59,7 61,8 60,0 51,9 61,0 59,6 63,6 56,9 60,6 60,0
(3) 46,2 47,7 38,9 48,6 41,2 20,0 51.9** 52,5 38,3 52,7 39,2 46,5 45,7
(4) 39,6 36,4 55,6 41,7 35,3 50,0 33,3 40,7 38,3 45,5 33,3 39,4 40,0
(5) 27,4 26,1 33,3 26,4 29,4 35,0 25,9 32,2 21,3 29,1 25,5 29,6 22,9
(6) 4,7 5,7 0,0 5,6 2,9 10,0 0.0* 1,7 8.5* 3,6 5,9 7,0 0,0
Survey responses to the question: How important are the following effects of diversification for your company? Please answer compared to the situation where your divisions were stand-alone companies and had to raise funds by 
themselves.
Ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (highly important). 
10,4
20,8
27,4
24,5
3-6
3-6
1-2, 5-6
1-2, 5-6
1-4, 632,1
Panel A
% somewhat or not 
important
Statistical differences of 
proportions in rows
% very or highly
important
1-5
Panel B
Size Lines of business Diversification Capital constrained Debt ratio Agency Cost
4,7
Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all responding firms. We report the mean score, the percentage of respondents that find a factor very (4) or highly important (5), and the percentage of respondents that 
find a factor somewhat (2) or not important (1). The last column reports results from McNemar tests (for the analysis of multiple proportions drawn from a single sample) to examine whether ratings of each pair of sub-questions 
are statistically different. For instance, the rating in row 1 ("lower cost of capital"; % very or highly important) is statistically different from the ratings in rows 3-6.
Panel B splits the sample by various characteristics and compares the proportion of respondents that answered 4 (very important) and 5 (highly important) across subsamples using chi-square tests (and for small expected 
frequencies Fisher's exact tests). See Table B for column/variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, or * denote statistical significance of differences in proportions across groups at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
69,8
60,4
46,2
39,6
27,4
Age Tenure Education
Panel B (continued)
Equity Managerial ownership Rating
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